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Abstract
When sharing data among researchers or releasing data for public use, there is a risk
of exposing sensitive information of individuals in the data set. Data synthesis is a
statistical disclosure limitation technique for releasing synthetic data sets with pseudo
individual records. Traditional data synthesis techniques often rely on strong assump-
tions of a data intruder’s behaviors and background knowledge to assess disclosure risk.
Differential privacy (DP) formulates a theoretical approach for a strong and robust pri-
vacy guarantee in data release without having to model intruders’ behaviors. Efforts
have been made aiming to incorporate the DP concept in the data synthesis process.
In this paper, we examine current DIfferentially Private Data Synthesis (DIPS) tech-
niques for releasing individual-level surrogate data for the original data, compare the
techniques conceptually, and evaluate the statistical utility and inferential properties of
the synthetic data via each DIPS technique through extensive simulation studies. Our
work sheds light on the practical feasibility and utility of the various DIPS approaches,
and suggests future research directions for DIPS.
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1 Introduction
When sharing data among collaborators or releasing data publicly, a big concern is the risk
of exposing the identification and personal information of the individuals who contribute to
the data. Even with key identifiers removed, a data intruder may still identify an individual
in a data set via linkage with other public information. Some notable examples on individual
identification breach in publicly released or restricted access data include the Netflix prize
(Narayanan & Shmatikov 2008), the genotype and HapMap linkage effort (Homer et al.
2008), the AOL search log release (Go¨tz et al. 2012), and the Washington State health
record identification (Sweeney 2013).
Statistical approaches to protecting data privacy are referred to as statistical disclosure lim-
itation. These techniques aim to provide protection for sensitive information while releasing
information and data to the public. Data synthesis is a statistical disclosure limitation tech-
nique that focuses on releasing individual-level data synthesized based on the information in
the original data (Rubin 1993, Little 1993, Liu & Little 2003, Raghunathan et al. 2003, Reiter
2003, Little et al. 2004, Reiter 2009, Drechsler 2011). Multiple synthetic sets of the identical
structure are often released as a way to propagate the uncertainty arising from the synthesis
process, a procedure referred to as multiple synthesis (MS). Methods have been developed to
combine the results from multiple synthetic data sets to will yield valid statistical inferences
(Raghunathan et al. 2003, Reiter 2002, 2003). However, existing disclosure risk assessment
approaches for statistical disclosure limitation techniques often depend on the specific values
in a given data set as well as various assumptions about the background knowledge and
behaviors of data intruders (Reiter 2005, Hundepool et al. 2012, Manrique-Vallier & Reiter
2012). In some cases, only heuristic arguments are employed without numerical assessment
of disclosure risk.
Differential privacy (DP), a concept popularized in the theoretical computer science commu-
nity, provides strong privacy guarantee in mathematical terms without making assumptions
about the background knowledge of data intruders (Dwork, McSherry, Nissim & Smith 2006,
Dwork 2008a, 2011). In brief, if a statistic is released via a -differentially private mecha-
nism, then, when the statistic is calculated from two neighboring data sets that differ by
one record, the log-difference on the probability to obtain a specific value of that statistic
is bounded between (−, ). In layman’s terms, DP means the chance an individual will be
identified based on the sanitized statistic is low (the smaller  is, the lower the probability is)
since the statistic would be about the same with or without the individual in the database.
DP has spurred a great amount work in developing differentially private mechanisms in gen-
eral settings (Dwork, McSherry, Nissim & Smith 2006, McSherry & Talwar 2007, McSherry
2009, Nissim & Stemmer 2015) as well as for specific statistical analysis such as data mining
(Mohammed et al. 2011), shrinkage regression (Chaudhuri et al. 2011, Kifer et al. 2012), prin-
ciple component analysis (Chaudhuri et al. 2012), genetic association tests (Yu et al. 2014),
Bayesian learning (Wang et al. 2015), location privacy (Xiao & Xiong 2015), recommender
systems (Friedman et al. 2016), deep learning (Abadi et al. 2016), among others. Software
or web-based interfaces to generate differentially private statistics are also in development,
such as RescueDP (Wang et al. 2016), an online aggregate monitoring scheme that publishes
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real-time population statistics on spatial-temporal, crowd-sourced data from mobile phone
users with DP, and Private data Sharing Interface (Gaboardi et al. 2016) that aims to allow
data sharing among researchers in the social sciences and other fields while satisfying DP.
DP was originally developed and is widely used for releasing aggregate or summary statistics
to answering queries submitted to a database. However, query-based data release has several
shortcomings. The requirement to pre-specify the level of privacy budget  often dictates the
number and the types of future queries. The curator of a database will refuse to answer any
further queries if the prespecified privacy budget is exhausted from answering all previous
queries. Additionally, data users would prefer to directly access the individual-level data to
perform statistical analysis on their own.
Efforts have also been made to release differentially private individual-level data, which we
will refer to as DIPS (DIfferentially Private Data Synthesis). Barak et al. (2007) gen-
erate synthetic data via the Fourier transformation and linear programming in low-order
contingency tables. Blum et al. (2013) discuss differentially private data synthesis from
the perspective of the learning theory. Abowd & Vilhuber (2008) propose an approach to
synthesize differentially private tabular data from the predictive posterior distributions of
frequencies, which was applied in the simulations studies in Charest (2010) to explore infer-
ences on proportions from synthesized binary data. McClure & Reiter (2012) implement a
similar technique for synthesizing binary data with a different specification of the differen-
tially private prior. Wasserman & Zhou (2010) propose several paradigms to sample from
appropriately differentially private perturbed histograms or empirical distribution functions.
They also examined the rate that the probability of empirical distribution of the synthetic
data converges to the true distribution of the original data. Zhang et al. (2014) propose
PrivBayes to release high-dimensional data from Bayesian networks with binary nodes and
low-order interactions among the nodes. Li et al. (2014a) develope DPCopula for synthe-
sizing multivariate data by using Copula functions to take into account the dependency
structure. Liu (2016b) proposes a Bayesian technique, model-based DIPS (MODIPS), to
release differentially private synthetic data, and explored the inferential properties of the
released data. Besides these generic DIPS approaches, there are also DIPS developed for
specific type of data such as graphs (Proserpio et al. 2012), and mobility data from GPS
trajectories (Chen et al. 2013, He et al. 2015).
The goals of this paper are two-fold. First, it introduces the powerful concept of DP to
the statistical community and surveys the current development in DIPS. Second, this paper
examines and compares some of the general DIPS approaches based on the statistical and
inferential utility of the respective synthesized data; both conceptually and empirically via
simulation studies and a real-life case study. We aim to, through this comparative exami-
nation of different DIPS approaches, demonstrate the useful applications of DP in releasing
synthetic data with guaranteed privacy and to provide some guidance on the feasibility of
the DIPS methods for practical use.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 overviews the basic concepts of
DP and some common differentially private mechanisms. Section 3 presents some currently
available DIPS approaches. Section 4 compares and examines the utility and inferential
properties of the individual-level surrogate data released from some of the DIPS methods
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introduced in Section 3 via four simulation studies on different types of data. Section 5
compares some DIPS methods to test the practical feasibility of DIPS on real-world data.
Concluding remarks are given in Section 6.
2 Concepts
The concepts of DP and the sanitization algorithms were developed originally for releasing
results of queries sent to a database. We rephrase the main concepts in DP below in terms
of statistics. There is essentially no difference between query results and statistics given
that both are functions of data. Denote the target data for protection by x = {xij} of
dimension n× p (i = 1, . . . , n; j = 1, . . . , p). Each row xi represents an individual record
with p variables/attributes.
2.1 Differential Privacy (DP) and Composition Properties
Definition 1. Differential Privacy (Dwork, McSherry, Nissim & Smith 2006): A saniti-
zation algorithm R gives -DP if for all data sets (x,x′) that is d(x,x′) = 1, and all subsets
Q ⊆ T ∣∣∣∣log( Pr(R(s(x)) ∈ Q)Pr(R(s(x′)) ∈ Q)
)∣∣∣∣ ≤ , (1)
where T denotes the output range of the algorithm R,  > 0 is the privacy budget (or
loss), and s denotes the statistics. d(x,x′) = 1 implies that x′ differs from x by only one
individual. Mathematically, Eqn (1) states that the log-difference on the probability of
obtaining a specific value of s via R is bounded by (−, ) when it is calculated from two
neighboring data sets that differ by one record. If  is small, then the chance an individual
will be identified based on the sanitized query result is low since the query results would be
about the same with or without the individual in the database. The larger  is, the sanitized
results are more differentiable with vs without an individual in the data set.
Regarding what value of  is considered to be appropriate or acceptable for practical use,
Dwork (2008b) states the choice of  is a social question (and “beyond the scope of” her
paper), but suggests 0.01 ∼ ln(3), or even up to 3 in some cases, as possible  values.
Lee & Clifton (2011) state that  does not easily relate to practically relevant measures of
privacy and suggest a formula to calculate  if the goal is to hide any individuals presence (or
absence) in the database. The formula relies on some assumptions, like query-dependency
and also requires knowing the data universe as well as the subset of that universe to be
queried. Abowd & Schmutte (2015) examine the question from the economic perspective by
accounting for the public-good properties of privacy loss and data utility, and quantify the
optimal choice of  by formulating a social planner’s problem and incorporating (, δ)-DP
(another relaxation of the pure DP; see Definition 5) and (α, δ)-accuracy (the l1 error in
released statistics is bounded by α with probability 1− β) to release normalized histograms
via the private multiplicative weights method. In two applications, they have examined the
optimal  is 0.067 and 0.044 for α = 0.096 and 0.073 (respectively) when β = 0.01 and
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δ = 0.9/N , where N is the population size for some specific settings on the population
size and query set size. If deemed valid, the  values suggested in the (, δ)-DP setting can
also be considered for -DP as the latter implies stricter privacy protection at the same 
value. However, the caveat of possible worse information preservative compared to its relaxed
counterpart. Other  values also came up in the literature. For example, Machanavajjhala
et al. (2008) apply DP in the OnTheMap data (commuting patterns of the US population)
and used ( = 8.6, δ = 10−5)-probabilistic DP (a relaxation of the pure DP in Eqn 1; see
Definition 6) to synthesize commuter data. Karwa et al. (2017) use  = 3 and  = 6 when
synthesizing edges in social networks via a randomized response mechanism with -edge DP.
Ding et al. (2011) and Li et al. (2014b) use  = 1 in the experiments.
All the work above suggests there are many factors that affect the choice of , including the
type of information released to the public, social perception of privacy protection, statistical
accuracy of the release data, among others. Also, that it remains an open question that
warrants more research and further investigation. The smaller  is, the less the privacy loss,
but the less accurate the released information. Choosing an “appropriate”  is essentially
finding a good trade-off between privacy loss and released information accuracy. We will
provide more discussion regarding the choice of  in Section 6, reviewing what we have
learned from the literature and the simulation/case studies.
Often is a data set queried for multiple statistics especially when the data is high-dimensional.
Every time the data set is queried, there is a privacy cost (loss) as information is being asked
about the same set of individuals. Therefore, the data curator must track all queries and
analysis conducted on a data set to ensure the overall privacy spending does not exceed the
pre-specified level. Say r queries are sent to the same data set with a total privacy budget
of . The data curator could allocate /r privacy budget to each of the r queries to maintain
the total privacy cost at . On the other hand, if each query is sent to a disjoint set of data
where each set has no overlapping individuals, then the privacy cost does not accumulate.
A typical example is the release of a histogram, where the counts in different bins of the
histogram are based on disjoint subsets of data, and each bin is perturbed with the full
privacy budget . These principles are presented in the sequential composition and parallel
composition theorems below.
Theorem 2. Composition Theorems (McSherry 2009): Suppose a differentially private
mechanism Rj provides j-DP for j = 1, . . . , r.
a) Sequential Composition: The sequence ofRj(x) executed on the same data set x provides
(
∑
j j)-DP.
b) Parallel Composition: Let Dj be disjoint subsets of the input domain D. The sequence
of Rj(x ∩Dj) provides max(j)-DP.
2.2 Relationship between DP and Disclosure Risk Assessment in the Tradi-
tional Statistical Disclosure Limitation Setting
The concept of DP is different from the traditional disclosure risk assessment in statistical
disclosure limitation. The former does not rely on any background knowledge or behavioral
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assumptions of a data intruder while the latter often models what’s the data intruder knows
and how the disclosure risk is formulated or calculated and could vary significantly, depending
on the data and the approaches for assessing disclosure risk, lacking a unified principle. We
now illustrate the differences between DP and the traditional disclosure risk assessment using
a concrete example.
Suppose a data set contains 11 attributes, one out of the 11 is a sensitive variable, such as
HIV status, and the other 10 are pseudo-identifiers such as age, gender, etc. In a typical
disclosure risk assessment, the data curator would first make an assumption about what the
intruder knows and what the intruder will do to obtain the information she/he is interested
in. Therefore, the curator will likely assume in this case that: 1) the intruder A wants the
information on the sensitive variable on individual B, and A knows that B is in the data
set; 2) A knows all 10 pseudo-identifiers of B; 3) A fits a logistic model to calculate the
probability of having HIV with the released data set. Suppose the true HIV status of B
is T and estimated Pr(HIV=T|the 10 attributes) is 5% from the logistic model based on a
synthetic copy of the original data; then from the perspective of the traditional disclosure
risk assessment, we would consider B is at a lower risk of getting his/her personal information
disclosed. However, how confident are we with this 5%? What if the data intruder has more
information in addition to the released data? What if the data intruder has a more efficient
method than the logistic regression to predict the HIV status with high accurate? In other
words, the single value 5% with all the above assumptions could be far from being optimal
in reflecting the true disclosure risk.
If the surrogate data set is synthesized via a technique based on the DP framework, then it is
guaranteed that any individual (including B) from the original data has little impact on any
statistics calculated from the synthetic data, and the impact is quantified by the probabilities
of obtaining the same statistic with vs. without any single individual, the ratio between which
is bounded by (e−, e). In this example, the statistic s is Pr(HIV|the 10 attributes), and
the the ratio Pr(s
∗|x∗)
Pr(s∗|x′∗) ∈ (e−, e), where data x∗ and x′∗ differ by one individual and s∗ is
the sanitized version of the observed original s based on the synthetic data. Using a small 
leads to a tight neighborhood (e−, e) around 1, and a small privacy loss.
A reviewer asks if DP can be used as an upper bound for disclosure risk assessment. The
above example suggests the way the DP bounds the absolute log-ratio of two distribution
functions on the sanitized version of s obtained from two neighboring data sets (x and x′)
by  rather than providing a direct measure on the probability that an individual would be
identified or have his/her true value on a sensitive variable disclosed. Lee & Clifton (2011)
calculate an upper bound for the posterior probability of a correct guess from an adversary
on whether an individual is in a data set given discrete query results sanitized via the Laplace
mechanism under some assumptions. However, the bound is not tight.
In summary, the link between DP and the traditional disclosure risk assessment is an inter-
esting topic and open question. One thing for sure is that DP integrates out all the unknowns
(e.g., whether and how data intruder would use that data set, whether an individual in a
particular data set or will participate in any future studies, etc) and covers the worst-case
scenario, whether the data curator can think of or not, from the perspective of protecting
every individual.
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2.3 Empirical DP and Local DP
Classical DP has inspired other privacy concepts such as the empirical DP (Abowd et al.
2013) and local DP (Duchi et al. 2013), both of which look for bounding some type of
“privacy” using a single parameter . We will not examine the two concepts further in this
discussion for the reasons given below.
Empirical DP was first proposed for privacy protection in Bayesian mixed-effects modeling.
In empirical DP, a prior distribution is designed to guarantee that the log difference on the
posterior distribution of a parameter with vs. without each of the individuals in the original
data is bounded by (−, ). Charest & Hou (2017) showed that empirical DP is more of an
empirical measurement of sensitivity, and relates to the so-called “local sensitivity” (Nissim
et al. 2007) rather than a guarantee or an empirical estimate of DP. In addition, empirical
DP is computationally sensitive to how many posterior samples are drawn and how they
are binned in its numerical calculation as the analytical form of the posterior distribution is
often not available.
For local DP, though its mathematical formulation seems to similar to the classical DP,
the two are conceptually different. Local DP focuses on how individual data is collected.
Specifically, the true response of the individual goes through a locally -differentially pri-
vate randomization mechanism that generates a perturbed response, which is recorded and
released. Different from the traditional DP (where the privacy budget  is possessed by a
whole data set) each individual receives a privacy budget  in local DP, and the log-difference
in the probability of generating the same perturbed response from two different individual
responses is bounded by (−, ). Local DP has been applied in practice to collect users’ data
(Erlingsson et al. 2014, Fanti et al. 2016, Tang et al. 2017); but given its conceptual difference
from the classical DP, we leave its in-depth investigation and exploration for future research
(more discussion on the local DP is provided in Section 6).
2.4 Differentially Private Mechanisms
We introduce two commonly used sanitizers to achieve -DP: the Laplace mechanism and the
Exponential mechanism. A key concept in the Laplace mechanism is the global sensitivity
of s (Dwork, McSherry, Nissim & Smith 2006), defined as the following: For all (x,x′) that
is d(x,x′) = 1, the global sensitivity of statistics s is ∆s = max
x,x′,d(x,x′)=1
‖s(x) − s(x′)‖1. In
layman’s terms, ∆s is the maximum change in terms of l1 norm a person would expect in s
across all possible configurations of (x,x′) and d(x,x′) = 1. The sensitivity is “global” since
it is defined for all possible data sets and all possible ways that two data sets differ by one
observation. The higher ∆s is the more disclosure risk there will be on the individuals in the
data from releasing the original s.
Definition 3. Laplace Mechanism (Dwork, McSherry, Nissim & Smith 2006): The Laplace
mechanism of -DP adds independent noises e from the Laplace distribution with location
parameter 0 and scale parameter ∆s
−1 to each of the elements of the original result s to
generate perturbed result s∗ = s + e.
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By the Laplace distribution, values closer to the raw results s have higher probabilities
of being released than those that are further away from s. The variance of the Laplace
distribution is 2 (∆s
−1)2, implying the smaller the privacy budget  and/or the larger the
∆s, the higher the probability that the perturbed result s
∗ will be farther way from s when
released. The Laplace mechanism is a quick and simple DP mechanism, but does not apply
to all statistics such as statistics that have non-numerical outputs. McSherry & Talwar
(2007) introduces a more general DP mechanism, the Exponential mechanism, that applies
to all types of queries.
Definition 4. Exponential Mechanism (McSherry & Talwar 2007): In the Exponential
mechanism, a utility function u assigns a score to each possible output s∗ and releases s∗
with probability
exp
(
u(s∗|x) 
2∆u
)
∫
exp
(
u(s∗|x) 
2∆u
)
ds∗
(2)
to ensure -DP, where ∆u = max
x,x′,d(x,x′)=1
∣∣u(s∗|x)− u(s∗|x′)∣∣ is the maximum change in score
u with one row change in the data (if s∗ is discrete, the integral in Eqn (2) is replaced with
summation).
Per the Exponential mechanism, the probability of returning s∗ increases exponentially with
the utility score. For example, if s is numerical and the goal is to preserve as much original in-
formation as possible, metrics measuring the closeness between s∗ and the original s are good
candidates for u such as the negative p-norm distance −||s− s∗||p = −
(∑r
j=1
∣∣sj − s∗j ∣∣p)1/p
(Liu 2016a). When the l1 norm is used, the Exponential mechanism in Definition 4 becomes
the Laplace mechanism with halved privacy budget (McSherry & Talwar 2007, Liu 2016a).
Both the Laplace mechanism and Exponential mechanism are widely applied in develop-
ing more complicated mechanisms, such as the multiplicative weight approach of generating
synthetic discrete data iteratively (Hardt & Rothblum 2010) and the median mechanism for
efficiently releasing correlated queries (Roth & Roughgarden 2010).
Besides the Laplace mechanism and the Exponential mechanism, there are other sanitizers
for general settings, such as the Gaussian mechanism that adds Gaussian noise to satisfy
a softer version of DP (Section 2.5) (Dwork & Roth 2013, Liu 2016a) and the generalized
Gaussian mechanisms that include the Laplace mechanism and the Gaussian mechanism as
special cases (Liu 2016a).
2.5 Relaxations of Pure DP
One criticism of the pure -DP in Section 2.1 is the potentially large amount of noise be-
ing added to query results to achieve a high level of privacy guarantee. This concern has
motivated work on relaxing the pure -DP. We briefly overview three relaxations: approx-
imate differential privacy (aDP), probabilistic differential privacy (pDP), and concentrated
differential privacy (cDP).
Definition 5. Approximate Differential Privacy (Dwork, Kenthapadi, McSherry, Mironov
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& Naor 2006): A sanitization algorithm R gives (, δ)-aDP if for all data sets (x,x′) that
are d(x,x′)=1,
Pr(R(s(x)) ∈ Q) ≤ exp() Pr(R(s(x′)) ∈ Q) + δ, (3)
where δ > 0 is typically chosen based on the sample size of the data set n that satisfies
δ(n)/nr → 0 for all r > 0. The pure -DP is a special case of aDP when δ = 0.
Definition 6. Probabilistic Differential Privacy (Machanavajjhala et al. 2008): A san-
itization algorithm R gives (, δ)-pDP if
Pr (R(s(x)) ∈ Disc(x, )) ≤ δ (4)
for all data sets (x,x′) that are d(x,x′) = 1, where Disc(x, ) is the disclosure set R(s(x))
such that
∣∣∣ln( Pr(R(s(x))∈Q)Pr(R(s(x′))∈Q))∣∣∣ > . Eqn (4) can be interpreted as the pure -DP fails with
probability δ.
Definition 7. Concentrated Differential Privacy (Dwork & Rothblum 2016): For
all data sets (x,x′) that is d(x,x′) = 1, a sanitization algorithm R gives (µ, τ)-cDP if
DsubG(R(x)||R(x′))  (µ, τ), where DsubG stands for subGaussian divergence, defined as
follows: two random variables Y and Z are DsubG(Y ||Z)  (µ, τ) if and only if E(LY ||Z) ≤ µ
and the centered distribution of (LY ||Z − E(LY ||Z) is defined and τ -subgaussian, where
L(Y ||Z) = ln (p(Y )/p(Z)) is the privacy loss random variable.
Both pDP and cDP regard privacy loss as random variables, but cDP has some advantages
over pDP. First, cDP has a bounded expected privacy loss whereas pDP has an infinite
privacy loss with probability δ. Second, cDP has better accuracy without compromising the
privacy loss from multiple inquiries (Dwork & Rothblum 2016).
3 Differentially Private Data Synthesis (DIPS)
We loosely group the currently available DIPS methods into two categories: the non-
parametric approach (NP-DIPS) and the parametric approach (P-DIPS). In the NP-DIPS
approach, the synthesizer is constructed based on the empirical distribution of the data,
while in the P-DIPS approach it is constructed based on a parametric distribution or an
appropriately defined model for the original data.
3.1 Non-parametric DIPS (NP-DIPS)
When the original data is categorical, the statistics s targeted for differentially private saniti-
zation are the cell counts or proportions in some types of cross-tabulation in NP-DIPS, from
which the synthetic data will be from generated. In the case of continuous data, the NP-
DIPS techniques can be applied to generate differentially private histograms, kernel density
estimators, or empirical distributions. The list of the NP-DIPS covered in section is given
in Table 1. Our goal is not to discuss every NP-DIPS method out there in the literature,
which would be impossible to achieve in one paper. The list is not exhaustive, but should
provide the readers an idea on how DIPS works in the non-parametric setting.
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Table 1: Summary of NP-DIPS approaches discussed in Section 3.1
Sec Method Pros Cons
3.1.1 Laplace sanitizer simple; fast
not accurate for large number
of queries
3.1.1 Fourier transformation
preserves low-order
marginals accurately
computationally expensive as
the number of attributes
increases
3.1.1
multiplicative weights
Exponential mechanism
adaptive, preserves
consistency of
marginals across
tables
difficulty of choosing an
appropriate iteration number;
inaccuracy
3.1.2 perturbed histogram simple; fast
discretization of continuous
attributes; doesn’t preserve
correlation well
3.1.2 smoothed histogram simple; fast
discretization of continuous
attributes; worse than
perturbed histogram in
accuracy
3.1.2
empirical cumulative
density function via
Exponential mechanism
flexible; general computational infeasibility
3.1.2
kernel density
estimator with
Gaussian process noise
general
works for (, δ)-aDP; curse of
dimensionality
3.1.3
histogram with
constrained inferences
better accuracy than
perturbed histogram
constrains are publicly known
or inherent
3.1.3 universal histogram
accuracy for
low-order counts
less accurate for high-order
counts
3.1.3 DPCube
multidimensional
data
inefficiency in constructing
accurate high-dimensional
histograms; performs worse
than the Laplace sanitizer
3.1.3
NoiseFirst and
StructureFirst
outperforms several
other DP methods
low dimensional histograms;
non-consistency as →∞
3.1.3
Exponential Fourier
perturbation and P-H
Partition
better than
NoiseFirst and
StructureFirst
depends on histogram
compressibility
3.1.1 Synthesis of Categorical Data
In a data set with p categorical variables, a straightforward approach in generating synthetic
data is to add Laplace noise to the cell counts of k-way cross-tabulation of x, where k ≤ p,
and then to generate individual level of data from the sanitized counts. If k = p, it is
the full cross-tabulation of x, and the individual-level data are straightforward to generate
from sanitized counts. If k < p, there are (pk) k-way contingency tables, and the sanitization
process needs to be carefully planned so that all k-way tables are consistent to yield legitimate
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marginals and individual-level data.
When k = p, denote the original frequencies of the K cells formed by the p-way cross-
tabulation of x by n = (n1, ..., nK). The Laplace sanitizer perturbs the original n via
n∗j = nj + ej, where ej ∼ Lap(0,∆s/) independently for j = 1, . . . , K. ∆s is the l1 global
sensitivity from releasing the whole cross-tabulation. ∆s can be set at 2 or 1, depending on
how d(x,x′) = 1 is defined. Specifically, if the change in one individual refers to the case
that n remains the same, but the data in exactly one individual change, then ∆s = 2. If
the change in one individual refers to removal of one individual from the data, then ∆s = 1.
When n is relatively large, say > 30, the difference in the standard deviations of the Laplace
noises
√
2n−1 between the two versions is O(10−2). There is no practical difference on which
one to use. In the simulation studies and the case study presented later, we used ∆s = 1.
Given the smallest n examined was 40, we expect the results to remain roughly the same if
we had used ∆s = 2.
When k < p, Barak et al. (2007) conduct early work on constructing k-way differentially
private, consistent, and non-negative contingency tables via a Fourier transformation. The
approach identifies the complete set of metrics required to reproduce a contingency table,
where each cell is perturbed to achieve the same level of accuracy. Another approach to
generate individual-level data in the discrete domain is the multiplicative weights Exponen-
tial mechanism approach based on linear queries (Hardt et al. 2012). The multiplicative
weights Exponential mechanism method approximates the original distribution in a differ-
entially private manner through an iterative process. It starts from a uniform distribution
over the supports of all the attributes in the original data, and then updates the distribu-
tion via multiplicative weighting based on a query sampled via the Exponential mechanism
and sanitized via the Laplace mechanism in each iteration. Since every iteration access the
original data, the total privacy needs to be divided by the number of iterations.
The Fourier transformation based algorithm depends on the linear programming and could
be computationally infeasible when p is large. Though the multiplicative weights Exponential
mechanism approach is computationally more efficient, it is difficult to choose an optimal
iteration number especially when p is large. A small number of iterations would not be
sufficient to capture the information in the original queries, leading to biased synthetic data,
while a large number of iterations will introduce too much noise during the data generation
process, rendering the synthetic data useless. The inaccuracy of the multiplicative weights
Exponential mechanism is documented in Li et al. (2016), Vadhan (2017), Kowalczyk et al.
(2017) and is also confirmed by the simulation studies we have conducted. For these reasons,
we do not evaluate the Fourier transformation based method and the multiplicative weights
Exponential mechanism in Section 4.
3.1.2 Synthesis of Numerical Data
A straightforward approach for releasing differentially private numerical data is to first gen-
erate differentially private histograms, and then synthesize numerical data by drawing a bin
according to the relative sanitized frequencies of the histogram bins, and lastly, sample data
from the uniform distributions bounded by the sampled bin endpoints in the previous step.
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To form histograms on the original numerical data, discretization is necessary. And there
could be a large number of data bins/cubes if high-order interactions exist among the data
attributes and are taken into account when the histogram is generated. Let K be the total
number of bins (or squares/cubes in the multidimensional case), nk =
∑K
k=1 I(xi ∈ Bk) be the
number of observations in Bk for k = 1, . . . , K, pˆk = nk/n, and I() be the indicator function
(I(xi ∈ Bk) = 1 if xi ∈ Bk; 0 otherwise), a mean-squared consistent density histogram
estimator is fˆK(x) =
∑K
k=1KpˆkI(x ∈ Bk) (Scott 2015). A differentially private perturbed
histogram is a direct application of the Laplace mechanism. The sanitized bin counts and
proportions with -DP are given by n∗k = nk + ek and pˆ
∗
k = n
∗
k/
∑
k n
∗
k, respectively, where
ek
iid∼ Lap(0,∆s/) with ∆s = 1. The density histogram estimator that satisfies -DP is thus
fˆ ∗K(x) =
∑K
k=1Kpˆ
∗
kI(x ∈ Bk). (5)
Note that sanitized n∗k can be negative since the Laplace noise ∈ (−∞,∞), especially when
nk is small or  is small. Commonly used post-hoc processing approaches include replacing
negative n∗k with 0 (Barak et al. 2007) or using the truncated or boundary inflated truncated
Laplace distributions to obtain legitimate data (Liu 2016c). To incorporate the uncertainty
introduced by the sanitization process, releasing multiple sets of x˜ is suggested, one set per
sanitized n∗ = {n∗k}1:K .
Another method to generate differentially private histograms is the smoothed histogram
approach. Wasserman & Zhou (2010) provided the formulation of smoothed histograms of
-DP for x ∈ [0, 1]p, where p is the number of numerical attributes. It is easy to extend
the formulation to the general case when x is bounded by [c10, c11] × ... × [cp0, cp1]. The
differentially private smooth histogram is
fˆ ∗K(x) = (1− λ) fˆK(x) + λΩ, where Ω =
(∏p
j=1(cj1 − cj0)
)−1
, (6)
and λ ≥ K
K + n (e/n − 1) (7)
is a constant between 0 and 1 to satisfy -DP. When  → 0, λ → 1, the synthetic data are
simulated from a uniform-like fˆ ∗K(x) that is too noisy to be of any use. When →∞, λ→ 0,
fˆ ∗K(x) → fˆK(x), the synthetic data would have minimal privacy protection from the DP
perspective. Since λ is a constant given n,K and , fˆK(x) is not subject to randomness either,
it is not necessary to release multiple sets of x˜ from fˆ ∗K(x) from an inferential perspective.
In addition to the perturbed histogram and smooth histogram approaches, there is also the
approach to generating data from differentially private empirical cumulative density functions
via the Exponential mechanism (Wasserman & Zhou 2010). Specifically, surrogate data x˜ is
simulated from
h(x˜) =
gx(x˜)∫
[c10,c11]×···×[cp0,cp1] gx(z)dz
, (8)
where gx(x˜) = exp
(
−u(Fˆx, Fˆx˜) 
2∆u
)
,∆u = sup
x,x′,∆(x,x′)=1
sup
x˜
∣∣∣u(Fˆx, Fˆx˜)− u(Fˆx′ , Fˆx˜)∣∣∣ ,
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Fˆx is the original empirical cumulative density function, Fˆx˜ is the empirical cumulative
density function’s of the sanitized data, u is the utility function that denotes a distance
measure between the two cumulative density functions, and ∆u is the sensitivity of u. If the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov distance is used on u, ∆u ≤ n−1 (Wasserman & Zhou 2010). However,
releasing x˜ via the Exponential mechanism defined in Eqn (8) does not seem to be a viable
choice in practice. One difficulty lies in defining the set of all possible candidate cumulative
density functions, the size of which increases rapidly with sample size n and p, making the
synthesis process computationally challenging and unrealistic for a large data set. Due to
the impracticality of this approach, we did not implement this method in our simulation
studies.
Hall et al. (2013) propose sanitizing kernel density estimator by adding noise from a Gaussian
process to yield DP, from which synthetic data can be generated. If a Gaussian kernel is used,
they show there is no loss of accuracy in the differentially private kernel density estimator
to the original one with the optimal bandwidth that minimizes the integrated mean squared
error. However, the method is currently only available for (, δ)-aDP for δ > 0, and suffers
the same curse of dimensionality for large p (Scott 2015).
3.1.3 Other NP-DIPS Methods
There are also various extensions to the basic Laplace sanitizer and the perturbed histogram
approach with the purposes to improve their accuracy. Hay et al. (2010) suggested boosting
the accuracy of differentially private histograms by sorting the bin values after sanitation if
the order of the bin size is known to the public. They also suggested a universal histogram
approach by exploring the inherent consistency in a hierarchical histogram, and proved that
the accuracy of lower-order contingency tables/marginals is improved, but at the sacrifice
of high-order contingency tables (Qardaji et al. 2013, Hay et al. 2016). Xiao et al. (2012)
applied a 2-phase partitioning strategy, DPCube, to multidimensional data cubes. Gardner
et al. (2013) implemented DPCube in biomedical data to demonstrate its practical feasi-
bility on real-world data sets, but found that DPCube was still inefficient in constructing
accurate high-dimensional histograms. Additionally, Hay et al. (2016) showed that DPCube
performed worse than the Laplace sanitizer. Xu et al. (2013) proposed two mechanisms,
NoiseFirst and StructureFirst, that performed well against some DP methods, but only ap-
plied to low dimensional histograms due to long running time. Moreover, StructureFirst is
inconsistent; where the error of the statistics does not tend to 0 as  increases to infinity
(Qardaji et al. 2013, Hay et al. 2016). Acs et al. (2012) presented two sanitization tech-
niques, the Exponential Fourier perturbation algorithm and the P-H Partition, that sanitize
compressed data to exploit the inherent redundancy of real-life data sets. From the exper-
imental results, the techniques outperformed some DP methods, including NoiseFirst and
StructureFirst, but the performance depended on the compressibility of a histogram.
In summary, the accuracy improvements, if any, of the above methods over the basic Laplace
sanitizer or the perturbed histogram either utilize some constraints that only exist in certain
types of histograms/data, or only benefit low dimensional histograms. For these reasons,
we do not explore these extensions in the simulations studies in Section 4. That being said,
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it is of our interest to further explore these extended methods that provide better accuracy
in low-dimensional histograms in the future, by coupling them with efficient and accurate
dimensional reduction techniques.
3.2 Parametric DIPS (P-DIPS)
The synthesizers in the P-DIPS category are based on an assumed distribution or an appro-
priately defined model given the original data. In what follows, we describe the Multinomial-
Dirichlet synthesizer and other methods motivated by the Multinomial-Dirichlet synthesizer
for categorical data, the model-based DIPS (MODIPS) approach for general data types based
on a Bayesian modeling framework, and sequential regression synthesizers. The list of the
P-DIPS covered in section is given in Table 2. The list is not meant to be exhaustive nor
does it list the methods that deal with a specific type of data, but it gives readers an idea
on how DIPS works in the parametric setting. The PrivBayes method based on Bayesian
networks and the DPCopula, though listed in Table 2, will not be covered in full details in
this section given that they are not as widely used for routine data analysis.
Table 2: Summary of Parametric DIPS approaches discussed in Section 3.2.
Sec Method Data Pros Cons
3.2.1
Multinomial-
Dirichlet,
Binomial-
Beta
categorical
straightforward;
easy to implement
performs poorly on sparse
data; perturbation amount
increases with n; possible
biased inferences on
proportions
3.2.2
Model-based
DIPS
(MODIPS)
any
general; the DP
version of the
model-based
multiple synthesis
without DP
model-dependent; relies on
identification and
sanitization of sufficient
statistics or likelihood
functions
3.2.3
Sequential
Regression
Modeling
Synthesizers
any
general; models the
correlations among
all variables
large amount noises for
large p;
PrivBayes categorical
models dependency
among variable;
has an inherent
model selection
component
requires dichotomization
on continuous attributes;
depends on a quality
function that can be
computationally inefficient
DPCopula any general
same limitations for copula
models in general and
quadratic time complexity
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3.2.1 Multinomial-Dirichlet Synthesizer
Abowd & Vilhuber (2008) proposed the Multinomial-Dirichlet synthesizer to generate differ-
entially private categorical data in the Bayesian framework. The likelihood of proportions pi
is constructed from f(n|pi) ∼ Multinom(n,pi), where n = (n1, . . . , nK) contains the original
cell counts in K categories in the original data and n =
∑
k nk. A Dirichlet prior f(pi)=D(α)
is imposed on pi, where each element of α is set at α∗k = n/(e
 − 1), the minimum value
that guarantees -DP, for k = 1, ..., K. To generate differentially private surrogate data
sets, pi∗ is first simulated from the posterior distribution f(pi∗|x) = D(α∗ + n), and then
synthetic data is drawn from f(n˜|pi∗) = Multinom(n,pi∗). To ensure valid inferences in the
synthetic data, multiple sets of n˜ can be released; one for each differentially private pi∗. The
Multinomial-Dirichlet synthesizer reduces to the Binomial-Beta synthesizer in the binary
case. McClure & Reiter (2012) proposed a slightly different approach to synthesizing binary
data from f(n˜|n)=Binom
(
n, n1+α1
n+α1+α2
)
, where α1 =α2 =
(
e/n − 1)−1 to satisfy -DP, which
we refer to as the Binomial-Beta McClure-Reiter approach. The Binomial-Beta McClure-
Reiter differs from the Binomial-Beta synthesizer not only in how the prior on pi differ, but
also that it does not simulate pi from its posterior distribution thus n˜ synthesized via the
Binomial-Beta McClure-Reiter has one less layer variability.
In both the Multinomial-Dirichlet/Binomial-Beta and the Binomial-Beta McClure-Reiter
synthesizers, α∗k increases with n, implying that when data/observed information increases,
the amount of perturbation required to maintain -DP also increases and can be nontrivial
for any n. Furthermore, since all α∗k’s for k = 1, ..., K are equal, when nk’s are not the
same across the K categories, the perturbation will bias the synthetic proportions away
from their originals. Charest (2010) modeled explicitly the Binomial-Beta mechanism in
a Bayesian framework in the binary data case to reduce the bias of the inferences in the
synthetic binary data, which seems to be effective as long as  is not too small.
3.2.2 Model-based DIPS (MODIPS)
The MODIPS approach is based in a Bayesian modeling framework and releases m sets of
multiple differentially private surrogate data to the original data to account for the uncer-
tainty of the synthesis model (Liu 2016b). An illustration of the MODIPS algorithm is given
in Figure 1. The MODIPS approach first constructs an appropriate Bayesian model from
Figure 1: The MODIPS algorithm
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the original data and identifies the Bayesian sufficient statistics s associated with the model.
The posterior distribution of θ can then be represented as f(θ|s). The MODIPS then sani-
tizes s with privacy budget /m. Denote the sanitized s by s∗. Synthetic data x˜ is simulated
given s∗ by first drawing θ∗ from the posterior distribution f(θ|s∗), and then simulating x˜∗
from f(x|θ∗). The procedure is repeated m times to generate m surrogate data sets.
Since the MODIPS approach is model-dependent, the identification and validation of an
appropriate model for data x is critical, and model mis-specification will generate biased
samples. If the identification of a suitable model is based on previous knowledge and common
practice, then no privacy will need to be spend; however, if the model selection procedure is
based on the the data to be released, then the data curator will have to a certain portion of the
total privacy budget to the model selection procedure. Differentially private model selection
is a separate research topic that is beyond the scope of this paper. When there are several
plausible models, the model averaging idea can be incorporated into the synthetic data
generation and serves as a mitigation measure to model mis-specification and the dependency
of the synthetic data on a single synthesis model. The model averaging can be implemented
using the Bayesian model averaging method (Hoeting et al. 1999); but it can be analytically
and computationally demanding. An alternative approach, less formal but practically more
straightforward manner, can also be applied. Say there are 3 reasonable models – M1, M2,
and M3 – for the original data, with the “plausibility” weights 0.4, 0.3 and 0.3 for each model
(e.g., per Bayes factors). Suppose 10 sets of synthetic data are to be released; we could then
generate 4 sets of synthetic data from M1, 3 sets from M2, and 3 sets from M3, leading to 10
sets synthesized by 3 different models. The inferences based on the 10 sets (combined using
the method given in Section 3.3) will implicitly integrate out the model uncertainty, and
are more robust and less sensitive to the model selection and specification than in the case
where all 10 sets are generated from a single model. The downside of the model averaging
idea is that it will result in more uncertainty in the synthetic data, a price paid for more
robustness. In addition, the weights associated with the set of the models can be subjective,
even via the Bayes factor approach, which is known for its dependence on the priors.
3.2.3 Sequential Regression Modeling Synthesizers
Another method to generate DIPS data is through a sequential regression modeling synthe-
sizer approach, which, broadly speaking, can also be regarded as the MODIPS approach.
Specifically, suppose the variables from the data are X1, X2, . . . , Xp. The joint distribution
of f(X1, . . . , Xp) can be decomposed as f(X1)f(X2|X1) . . . f(Xp|X1, . . . , Xp−1), suggesting
data can be generated sequentially by first synthesizing X1 from f(X1), then X2 from the
conditional model of X2 given X1, and so on. Each of the p regression models needs to differ-
ently private and can borrow the existing framework on differentially private empirical risk
minimization (ERM) or differentially private regression models. For instance, Chaudhuri &
Monteleoni (2009) propose directly perturbing the minimizers or perturbing the empirical
risk to obtain differentially private minimizers in l2 regularized logistic regression, which is
extended to differentially private empirical risk minimization with differentiable and strongly
convex regularizers in Chaudhuri et al. (2011) and with non-differentiable regularizer in Kifer
et al. (2012). Zhang et al. (2012) propose the functional mechanism that adds noise to the
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objective function using the Laplace mechanism and estimates the global sensitivity through
a polynomial representation. The functional mechanism applies to both linear and logis-
tic regression, but the latter is based on the approximation through the Taylor expansion
and is susceptible to large amount of noise (Zhang et al. 2013). Sheffet (2015) examines
differentially private inferences (hypothesis testing and confidence interval construction) for
ordinary least squares and ridge estimator in linear regression.
The sequential regression modeling synthesizer accounts for the correlations among the var-
ious variables. In addition, the synthesizer can be implemented in most data types as long
as we have differentially private versions for the commonly used regression model types in
practice. The sequential modeling framework has been successfully implemented in practice
for imputing missing data (E. et al. 2001, of Michigan 2017 (accessed December 20, 2018)
and data synthesis (Kinney et al. 2011)). Used as a DIPS methods, there are a few potential
drawbacks. First, the total privacy budget needs to be divided into p portions due to the
DP sequential composition, and each regression model receives only a single portion. If p
is large, this approach could perform poorly in terms of statistical utility of the synthetic
data due to the lack of privacy budget per regression. Most of the DP regression techniques
mentioned above often output a single point estimate for the parameters involved in each
regression models, which can be plugged in to generate synthetic data. To properly propa-
gate the uncertainty around the parameters, we either have to model the synthesis process
analytically or release multiple synthetic data sets by drawing and plugging in multiple sets
of parameters as in the MODIPS approach. Third, efficient DP regression models are not
available for all model types (e.g., the Cox regression for survival data). One possible solu-
tion that circumvents regression modeling is the STEPS approach (Bowen & Liu 2018), a
nonparametric synthesizer that is also based sequentially “modeling” of the data.
3.3 Inferences from Synthetic Data via DIPS
Synthetic data generated by DIPS approaches are perturbed through the sanitization process
with random noise into the original data. Some P-DIPS approaches (such as the Multinomial-
Dirichlet synthesizer and MODIPS) also incorporate the uncertainty around the distribution
and model assumed on the original data. There are at least two approaches that account
for the sanitization/synthesis uncertainty in the inferences based on the synthetic data. The
first approach is to model the sanitization/synthesis process directly, such as in Charest
(2010) for synthesizing binary data and in Karwa et al. (2017), where the edges of a social
network are synthesized via a randomized response mechanism under -edge DP in the
exponential random graph models and then likelihood-based inference for missing data and
Markov chain Monte Carlo techniques (more specifically, Metropolis-Hastings algorithms)
are applied to model the synthesis process. This approach can be demanding for data users
both analytically and computationally. The second approach is to release multiple sets of
synthetic data, which can be regarded as a Monte Carlo version of the former. In the multiple
release approach, data users only need to analyze each surrogate data set as if they had the
original data set, and then combine the multiple sets of inferences in a legitimate way to
yield the final inferences. Suppose the parameter of interest is β. Denote the estimate of
β in the jth synthetic data by βˆj and the associated standard error by vj. The final point
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estimate β is
β¯ = m−1
∑m
j=1βˆj (9)
with Var(β¯) estimated by
T = m−1B +W, (10)
where B =
∑m
j=1(βˆj − β¯)2/(m− 1) (between-set variability) and W = m−1
∑m
j=1 v
2
j (average
per-set variability); and tests and confidence intervals are based on
(β¯ − β)T−1/2 ∼ tν=(m−1)(1+mW/B)2 . (11)
The formal proof of the variance combination rule for the MODIPS approach can be found
in Liu (2016b). Eqn (10) coincides with the variance combination rule in Reiter (2003) for
obtaining inferences from multiply synthetic sets in the context of non-DP setting for partial
synthesis, but the components of the between-set variability B difference in these two cases:
B in MODIPS has one more source of variability from sanitizing s compared to the non-DP
MS approach. Due to this, inferences from synthesized data via the MODIPS approach will
be less precise than those from non-DP MS approaches – a price paid for the DP guarantee.
Though not formally proved, it is expected Eqns (9) to (11) also apply in the Multinomial-
Dirichlet synthesizer and other DIPS approaches that use multiple set releases to account
for sanitization and synthesis uncertainty, though the sources that compose B might differ.
A reviewer questioned why the variance combination rule T = (1 + m−1)B − W for full
synthesis (Raghunathan et al. 2003) in the non-DP setting does not apply in this case. The
reasons is that T = (1 +m−1)B −W deals with the situation where data from non-sampled
units in a finite population are regarded as missing values and then filled in by multiple
imputation, followed by a second step of sampling from the imputed population while in
the context of MODIPS, there is no synthesis of a finite population or the extra step of
sampling from the population. As pointed out by Raghunathan et al. (2003) themselves,
due to “the random sampling of the units that compose the synthetic samples from each
multiply synthetic population” that is “not presented in the usual multiple imputation”, “the
between imputation already reflects the usual within imputation variability”, and thus T =
(1+m−1)B−W . In fact, the synthesis of the full sample, as done in the MODIPS approach,
can be viewed as a special case of the “partial synthesis” examined in Reiter (2003) with the
selection percentage of synthesis equal to 100%. We also conducted simulation studies and
showed T = (1 +m−1)B−W led to underestimate of the variance and undercoverage of the
confidence interval, while Eqn (10) delivered the nominal coverage.
4 Simulation Studies
We assess the utility and inferential properties of the sanitized data via some of the DIPS
approaches presented in Section 3 in four simulation studies. We examine the approaches
in the setting of the pure -DP through the application of the Laplace mechanism, but all
the DIPS approaches can be applied under softer versions of DP (eg, (, δ)-pDP) via the
employment of appropriate sanitizers (such as the Gaussian mechanism). The first and
second simulation studies focus on univariate categorical data and univariate continuous
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data, respectively; the third and fourth simulation studies involve a mixture of categorical
and continuous variables, but data are generated from different models.
Though the first and second simulation studies seem to be simple, the results on the impacts
of DP on the statistical inferences are in fact insightful even in these simple cases, especially
considering there is few work out there comparing different DIPS approaches in statistical
inferences; they also provide justifications for the choices of the DIPS approaches used in
the third and fourth simulation studies. In the fourth simulation, we examined the effect
of mis-specification on the synthesis model for the MODIPS approach, and investigated
the importance of selection and validation of an appropriate synthesis model. We did not
implement the model selection/validation procedures in simulation studies 1 to 2 due to the
simplicity of the data and thus the obvious choice of an appropriate model; neither did we
in simulation study 3 given that its similarity in the data structure with simulation 4, and
it would make no difference whether simulation studies 3 or 4 was used for the purposes of
illustrating the model selection/validation procedure in the MODIPS approach.
We varied the privacy budget  from e−4 to e4 in each simulation to examine its effect on the
statistical inferences. Though  as large as e4 might not be used in practice due to privacy
considerations, it is a useful theoretical exploration on the amount of privacy sacrifice in
order to have inferences based on the synthetic data to be close to the original; likewise, 
as small as e−4 helps us to understand what level of privacy would ruin the inferences to
an unacceptable degree based on the synthetic data. In all the examined DIPS approaches,
the sample size of each released synthetic set was the same as the original data, and 5 sets
of synthetic data were generated in DIPS approaches except for the smoothed histogram
and the Binomial-Beta McClure-Reiter approaches for reasons stated in Section 3. For the
DIPS approaches that generated 5 synthetic data sets, each synthesis received 1/5 of the
total privacy budget  per the sequential composition principle. The inferences based on the
DIPS synthetic data were benchmarked against those based on the original data and the
traditional non-DP MS technique.
4.1 Simulation Study 1: Categorical Data
The following DIPS methods are compared in this simulation study: the MODIPS synthe-
sizer, the Laplace sanitizer, the Binomial-Beta McClure-Reiter synthesizer, and the Multinomial-
Dirichlet synthesizer. Data was simulated from a Bernoulli distribution f(xi) = Bern(pi)
for i = 1, . . . , n. We examined 9 simulation scenarios for n ∈ {40, 100, 1000} and pi ∈
{0.10, 0.25, 0.50}, with 5000 repetitions per scenario.
The non-DP MS and the MODIPS approaches are model-based, and usually model selection
and validation should be applied to select an appropriate synthesis model. However, we
didn’t perform model and selection and validation given obvious choice of the likelihood
with the simplicity of the data in this simulation. With the binomial likelihood and prior
Beta(α, β) on pi, the posterior distribution of pi given x is f(pi|x) = Beta(α + n1, β + n −
n1) where n1 = #{xi = 1}. We set α = β = 1/3 (Kerman 2011). In the MODIPS
approach, we first located the Bayesian sufficient statistics s associated with the posterior
distribution f(pi|x), which is n1 with global sensitivity being 1. The Laplace mechanism was
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then employed to obtain n∗1 = n1 + e, where e ∼ Lap(0, −1). Finally, we sampled pi∗ from
f(pi∗|n∗1) = Beta(α + n∗1, β + n − n∗1), and x˜i from f(x˜i|pi∗) = Bern(pi∗) for i = 1, . . . , n to
generate one set of synthetic data. The cycle was repeated 5 times (from sanitizing n1 to
drawing x˜) to obtain 5 sets of synthetic binary data. The non-DP MS approach generated
synthetic data in a similar manner to the MODIPS approach except that there was no
perturbation of n1 and pi was sampled directly from f(pi|x) = Beta(α+ n1, β + n− n1), and
then x˜i was sampled from f(x˜i|pi) = Bern(pi). In the Laplace sanitizer, five sets of sanitized
binary data were directly generated per n∗1 = n1 + e without any distributional assumption
or model fitting.
In both the Laplace sanitizer and the MODIPS, the sanitized n∗ could be out of bounds [0, n]
as the Laplace noise is drawn from the real line. To legitimize n∗1, we applied truncation
(out-of-bounds n∗1 is thrown away and only in-bounds values are kept), and the boundary
inflated truncation (setting n∗1 < 0 values at 0 and those > n at n). Neither post-hoc
processing procedures compromised DP as no new information was leaked from the original
data (sample size n is assumed to be insensitive information and can be released) (Liu 2016c).
Bounding n∗ at [0, n] in the MODIPS implies that α∗ = α+n∗1 ≥ 0 and β∗ = β+n−n∗1 ≥ β
in f(pi∗|n∗1) = Beta(α+n∗1, β+n−n∗1). A reviewer suggested bounding n∗ at [−α, β+n], thus
α∗ ≥ 0 and β∗ ≥ 0 and a wider range of pi∗ can be sampled. We compared this truncation
scheme with the above two in this simulation and no significant differences were found.
Both the Binomial-Beta McClure-Reiter synthesizer and the Multinomial-Dirichlet syn-
thesizer simulated data x˜ from Bern(p∗); however, p∗ was fixed at n1+α
∗
n+α∗+β∗ with α
∗ =
β∗ = (e/n − 1)−1 for the Binomial-Beta McClure-Reiter synthesizer, and was drawn from
f(p∗|α∗, β∗) = Beta(α∗ + n1, β∗ + n − n1) for the Multinomial-Dirichlet synthesizer with
α∗ = β∗ = n/ (e − 1). In the Binomial-Beta McClure-Reiter sanitizer, a single synthetic set
was released. In the Multinomial-Dirichlet synthesizer, five synthetic sets were generated,
one per each sanitized p∗.
To obtain inferences on pi from the released data, each of the 5 sets was analyzed separately
in all the above synthesis approach except for the Binomial-Beta McClure-Reiter approach.
The point estimate of pi in the j-th (j = 1, ..., 5) synthetic data set was the sample proportion
pˆj, and its variance was estimated as vj = pˆj(1− pˆj)n−1. Eqns (9) to (11) were then applied
to obtain a final estimate of pˆ and the associated 95% confidence interval (CI). Figure 2
depicts the results on the bias and root mean squared error (RMSE), CI width, and the
coverage probabilities (CPs) of the 95% CIs for pi from each DIPS approach, the non-DP
MS approach, and the original data (we present only the results from the boundary inflated
truncation post-processing, which were better than the results from the truncation approach).
The results are summarized as follows. 1) The overall performances of the MODIPS and the
Laplace synthesizer were similar while those of the Multinomial-Dirichlet and Binomial-Beta
McClure-Reiter synthesizers were similar; in general, the inferences in the former two were
better than the latter two. 2) There was noticeable bias, large RMSE, and some under-
coverage especially when  < 1 and n was small across all DIPS approaches. The inferences
improved as  increased (more privacy budget and thus less perturbation), eventually
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approaching the original results for the Multinomial-Dirichlet and Binomial-Beta McClure-
Reiter synthesizers, and approaching the non-DP MS results for the MODIPS and the
Laplace sanitizer. 3) In the MODIPS and Laplace sanitizer, the amount of noise remained
constant regardless of n; in other words, the noise became less significant for larger n. In the
Multinomial-Dirichlet and the Binomial-Beta McClure-Reiter synthesizers, the perturbation
introduced through the prior information increased monotonically with n. As a result, there
was little improvement in inferences with larger n, which was a significant drawback for
the Multinomial-Dirichlet and the Binomial-Beta McClure-Reiter synthesizers. 4) Since the
prior mean of pi was 0.5 for the Multinomial-Dirichlet and the Binomial-Beta McClure-Reiter
synthesizers, when the sample proportion was not 0.5, the two sanitizers would introduce
bias into the released data. Therefore, the inferences were the best when pi = 0.5 for the
Multinomial-Dirichlet and Binomial-Beta McClure-Reiter synthesizers given the consistency
between the prior information and the data. 5) For the Laplace sanitizer and the MODIPS
approach, the inferences were also the best when pi = 0.5 since 0.5 was the mid point for the
range of a proportion, truncating at 0 or 1 did not skew the distribution of pi as much as when
pi was close to 0 or 1. 6) The RMSE values from the MODIPS and Laplace sanitizers were
much smaller than those from the Binomial-Beta McClure-Reiter and Multinomial-Dirichlet
synthesizes for most  values when pi 6=0.5; when pi=0.5, the Binomial-Beta McClure-Reiter
and Multinomial-Dirichlet synthesizers offered smaller RMSE values for small ; actually, the
values were even smaller than the original RMSE values for small  values and decreased when
there was more perturbation ( decreased). Again, this was due to the consistency of the
prior information and the data when pi=0.5. As  decreased, the prior in the Multinomial-
Dirichlet and Binomial-Beta McClure-Reiter priors became more “informative”, and injected
more “useful” prior information about pi that was consistent with the data, leading to smaller
RMSE. 7) The MODIPS and Laplace sanitizers produced close-to-nominal coverage (0.95)
across all the n and pi values, except for some undercoverage at small  and n due the rela-
tively large bias with the truncation at 0 and 1 for sanitized proportions. Eventually all CPs
converged to the nominal level as  increased in all the sanitizers except for the Binomial-Beta
McClure-Reiter synthesizer. 8) On the other hand, the CIs for the Laplace and the MODIPS
sanitizers were much wider when  < e−1 than those from the Binomial-Beta McClure-Reiter
and Multinomial-Dirichlet synthesizes.
4.2 Simulation Study 2: Continuous Data
The following methods are compared in this simulation study: the MODIPS synthesizer, the
NP-DIPS synthesizers via the perturbed histogram and the smoothed histogram approaches.
Data was simulated from N(µ, σ2). We manually truncated the simulated data at bounds
[c0 = µ− 3σ, c1 = µ+ 4σ] around µ to generate bounded data so that global sensitivity for
the sample mean and variances are finite and calculable. Since there was minimal probability
mass (0.0013) outside the [µ− 3σ, µ+ 4σ], the normal assumption was hardly affected with
the truncation (note that the bounds we used are asymmetric around the true µ, which is
more representative of real life data than symmetric bounds). We also examined symmetric
bounds, but present the results in the Supplementary materials. We examined 9 simulation
scenarios for n = {20, 100, 1000} and σ2 = {1, 4, 9}, with 5000 repetitions per scenario.
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Without loss of generality, µ was set to 0 in all scenarios.
With the obvious choice of the likelihood given the simplicity of the data, we did not perform
model selection and validation in this simulation. Let the prior be f(µ, σ2) ∝ σ−2, the
posterior distributions were f(σ2|x) = Inv-Gamma [(n− 1)/2, (n− 1)S2/2] and f(µ|x, σ2) =
N(x¯, n−1σ2), where x¯ and S2 were the sample mean and variance, respectively. In the non-DP
MS, a synthetic set was generated by first drawing σ2 and µ from their posterior distributions,
and then drawing x˜ from the normal distribution given the drawn µ and σ2. The process
repeated 5 times to generate 5 sets of synthetic data to release.
The MODIPS procedure started with sanitizing sufficient statistics s via the Laplace mecha-
nism, which were, in the posterior distribution f(µ, σ2|x), s = (x¯, S2). To calculate the global
sensitivity for x¯ and S2, we would need the global bounds of X. We assumed the bounds
of the data were publicly known knowledge, which is a realistic assumption in general. It
is very likely an attribute in a data set was not studied previously, and thus its bounds are
known (e.g., human height, income, or published biomarkers, etc). A reviewer questioned
the possible conservativeness of the bounds. If the bounds are conservative compared to the
local data, then it would not be a concern as DP protects against the worst case scenario and
the global bounds are what is needed instead of the local data. If the bounds are conservative
at the global level, this implies there is insufficient information on the attribute. In this case,
it would be better to be conservative rather than not from a privacy protection perspective
though it means more than necessary noises are injected. Future studies are expected to
help gain more understanding on the attribute and tighten the bounds. Note that using
the local bounds directly would violate privacy even if one is willing to spend some privacy
budget to perturb the bounds before using them. However, how to perturb the minimum
and maximum can be difficult without knowing the global bounds in the first place.
The global sensitivity was (c1 − c0)n−1 for x¯ and (c1 − c0)2n−1 for S2, where (c1 − c0) = 7σ
(Liu 2016b). Since the data was bounded, so were x¯ and S2. Specifically, the bounds for x¯
were [c0, c1], and that of S
2 were [0, (c1 − c0)2/4 · n/(n− 1)] (Macleod & Henderson 1984).
If a sanitized statistic was outside its range, it was post-processed by the boundary inflated
truncation procedure. Given the sanitized s∗ = {x¯∗, S2∗}, the MODIPS technique drew
σ2∗ from Inv-Gamma [(n− 1)/2, (n− 1)S2∗/2] and µ∗ from N(x¯∗, n−1σ2∗). Finally, x˜∗i was
simulated from N(µ∗, σ2∗) for i = 1, . . . , n to generate one synthetic set. The whole procedure
was repeated 5 times to generate 5 surrogate data sets. /5 of the total budget was spent
per synthesis. In addition, since there were two statistics, (x¯, S2), to sanitize over the same
set of data, the /5 budget per synthesis was further split in half between the sanitization of
x¯ and S2.
In deciding the number of bins for the histograms for the perturbed and smoothed histogram
approaches, we applied the Scott’s Rule after comparing it with the Sturges’ rule and the
Freedman-Diaconis rule (Scott 2015). Specifically, the bin width was set at hˆ = 3.5Sn−1/3,
where S was the sample standard deviation of x and n was the sample size. The median
number of bins was 7, 10, and 21 for n = 20, 100, and 1000, respectively, across all sim-
ulations (Table 2 in Supplemental Materials). In the perturbed histogram, all bin counts
were perturbed via the Laplace mechanism with ∆s = 1 to obtain the perturbed density
histogram (Eqn 5). The procedure was repeated 5 times to obtained 5 sets of differentially
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private pˆ∗j (the perturbed bin counts), based on the 5 sets of synthetic data that were sim-
ulated. For the smoothed histogram, we first calculated λ for a given  using Eqn (7), and
then constructed the smoothed histogram by applying Eqn (6), from which a single set of
synthetic data was generated and released.
To obtain the inference on µ and σ2 from the multiple released data sets via the MODIPS,
the perturbed histogram sanitizers, and the non-DP MS approach, each synthetic set j was
analyzed to obtain point estimates of µ and σ2, which were x¯j (the sample mean) and s
2
j
(the sample variance), respectively; the associated within-set variance estimates were s2j/n
and
(
s2j)
2(2(n− 1)−1+κjn−1
)
, respectively, where κj was the excess kurtosis in the j
th set.
Eqns (9) to (11) were then applied to obtain the final estimates and 95% CIs.
Figures 3 and 4 depict the bias, RMSE, 95% CI width, and the CP of the 95% CI for µ
and σ2 based on the synthetic data of µ and σ2 based on the synthetic data via the 3 DIPS
approaches, respectively. For the purposes of comparability across different values of σ2, the
bias, RMSE, and CI width for σ2 were scaled by the true σ2, referred to as the relative bias,
scaled RMSE and scaled CI width, respectively.
The results are summarized as follows. 1) For all approaches, there were some noticeable
biases and large RMSE at small  for both µ and σ2, which improved as  increased and even-
tually approached the original or the non-DP MS results. Overall, the perturbed histogram
seemed to offer the best trade-off between bias and variance for the inferences based on the
synthetic data. 2) For the MODIPS and the perturbed histogram approaches, the amount
of injected noise became immaterial as n increased, and the inferences improved. In the the
smoothed histogram, λ in Eqn (7) got larger and approached K/(K + ) as n increased. As
a result, increasing n did not help the inferences in the smoothed histogram. 3) The positive
bias in µ can be explained by the asymmetric bounds [µ − 3σ, µ + 4σ] of data x around µ.
When sanitized x¯∗ or synthesized data were out of bound, they were set at the boundary
values per the boundary inflated truncation procedure. Since the left bound µ − 3σ was
closer to µ, there were more values at µ − 3σ than at µ + 4σ, resulting in overestimation.
The observed positive bias in σ2 was expected due to the randomness introduced through
synthesis and sanitization. 4) In terms of RMSE, the histogram-based approaches produced
smaller RMSE for µ than the MODIPS for most of n and  < 1, but the situation switched
for σ2 with the smallest RMSE coming from the MODIPS. 5) In terms of CP, the MODIPS
produced close-to-nominal level coverage in all examined scenarios for both µ and σ2 at the
cost of wide CIs for  < 1; the perturbed histogram had moderate to mild undercoverage
with much narrower CIs; and the smooth histogram had unacceptable severe undercoverage
at small  for large n.
The results when the data bounds [µ − 4σ, µ + 4σ] were symmetric around the true mean
are presented in Figures 2 and 5 in the Supplemental Materials. As expected, there were
minimal biases on µ in all the DIPS approaches (there was some fluctuation in MODIPS
for small ), and the CP in all approaches were at nominal-level. The histogram-based
approaches delivered more precise estimates than MODIPS in the inferences of µ (smaller
RMSE and narrower CIs). However, the histogram-based approaches did not perform as
well as MODIPS in the inferences of σ2. Both the bias and RMSE were large and there was
severe undercoverage at small values of .
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4.3 Simulation Studies 3 and 4: Mixture of Continuous and Categorical Data
In simulation studies 3 and 4, we compared the MODIPS synthesizer and the NP-DIPS
synthesizer in data with mixed Gaussian variables x and categorical variables w. The data
were generated from the GLOM (General LOcation Model) based on f(x|w)f(w) in sim-
ulation 3, and from the SLOMAG model (Sequential LOgistic regression with MArginal
Gaussian distribution) f(w|x)f(x) in simulation 4. We also investigated the impact of
mis-specification of the synthesis models. For NP-DIPS in both simulations, we applied the
Laplace synthesizer on w coupled with the perturbed histogram for x. We did not implement
the Multinomial-Dirichlet synthesis or the smoothed histogram approach given their inferior
performances to the the Laplace sanitizer, the perturbed histogram, and the MODIPS based
on the results from simulation studies 1 and 2.
4.3.1 Simulation Study 3: GLOM Model
Data x comprised three categorical variables w = (w1,w2,w3) with 2, 3, and 4 levels,
respectively, and continuous variables z. Let nk denote the count in cell k in the full cross-
tabulation of w for k = 1, ..., 24. First, the counts n = {nk} in the 24 cells were simulated
from a Multinomial distribution with parameter pi = {pik} (which are summarized in Table
4 from the Supplemental Material); zik, = (zik1, zik2)
′ was then simulated from N(2)(µk,Σ)
for i = 1, . . . , nk and k = 1, ..., 24, where µk = (µk1, µk2)
′ was the mean of z in cell k, and
Σ was the covariance matrix that was set to be the same across all 24 cells. The summary
of the parameter values of µ1, µ2, pi across the 24 cells are provided in Table 3 in the
Supplemental Materials. We set n = 1000, the variances of zik1 and zik2, σ
2
1 = σ
2
2 = 1,
and their correlation at ρ = 0.50 with 5000 repetitions. zikj in cell k (where j = 1, 2) was
truncated at [c0,kj = µkj − 4σj, c1,kj = µkj + 4σj] to generate bounded data. Additionally,
in the Supplemental Materials, Table 4 depicts the summary statistics for the number of
observations in the 24 cells across the 5000 repetitions.
For the non-DP MS approach, we imposed Dirichlet prior pi, f(pi) = D(α), where α =
{α1, ..., α24} = 1/2, and priors f(µ1, . . . ,µ24,Σ) ∝ |Σ−1| . The posterior distributions were
f(pi|w) = D(α′), f(Σ|z,w) = Inv-Wishart(n − K,S), and f(µk|Σ, z,w) = N(2)(z¯k, n−1k Σ),
where α′ = α + n, S = n−1
∑K
k=1
∑nk
i=1(zik − z¯k)(zik − z¯k)′, and z¯k contained the sample
means of z in cell k. Synthetic data were simulated from the posterior predictive dis-
tribution f(z˜i, w˜i|z,w)by first drawing pi ∼ f(pi|w) = D(α + n), Σ from f(Σ|z,w) =
Inv-Wishart(n−K, Σˆ), and µk from f(µk|Σ, z,w) = N(2)(z¯k, n−1k Σ); then sampling w˜ from
f(w˜|pi) = Multinom(n,pi), and z˜i from f(zi|w˜i,Σ) = N(2)(µk,Σ) for i= 1, ..., n˜k, where n˜k
was the count in cell k based on the synthesized w˜. The drawing process repeated 5 times
to generate 5 synthetic sets.
The Bayesian sufficient statistics from the above Bayesian model was s = (n, S, z¯); z¯ con-
tained the 24 pairs of cell means of z1 and z2. The MODIPS procedure started with sanitizing
s via the Laplace mechanism to obtain s∗ = (n∗, S∗, z¯∗) (the l1 global sensitivity was 1 for
n, (c1,kj − c0,kj)n−1k for z¯kj, and (c1,kj − c0,kj)2(n− 1)(n(n−K))−1 for each entry in S (Liu
2016c), where c1,kj − c0,kj = 8σ for k = 1, . . . , 24 and j = 1, 2). Given s∗, the MODIPS
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method first drew pi∗ from f(pi∗|n∗) = D(α + n∗), w˜∗ from f(w˜∗|pi∗) = Multinom(n,pi∗),
Σ∗ from f(Σ∗|S∗) = Inv-Wishart(n −K,S∗), µ∗k from f(µ∗k|Σ∗, z¯∗,w) = N(z¯∗k, n−1k Σ∗); and
then z˜i was simulated from f(zi|µ∗k˜,Σ∗) = N(µ∗k˜,Σ∗) for i = 1, ..., , n˜∗k to generate one set of
surrogate data, where n˜∗k was the count in cell k based on the synthesized w˜
∗, and k˜ indicates
the cell which the simulated case i belonged to given the synthesized w˜∗i . The procedure was
repeated 5 times to generate 5 synthetic sets with /5 privacy budget each. Since s contained
6 components: n, z¯1, z¯2, two variance terms and one covariance term from S, each received
1/6 of /5 budget allocated to each synthesis (there was no need to split /30 further among
the 24 elements in n per the parallel composition as they were formed over non-overlapping
subsets; similar for z¯1, z¯2, respectively).
In the NP-DIPS approach, we applied the Laplace sanitizer to sanitize 24 cell counts n formed
by the full cross-tabulation of w, and the perturbed histogram method to sanitize continuous
z within each of the 24 cells. Since z was 2-dimensional, each bin of the histogram of z was a
square rather than an interval. The number of bins were determined using the Scott’s rule,
and the medians ranged from 16 to 49 across the 5000 repeats in the 24 cells (Supplemental
Materials Table 5). The process was repeated 5 times to create 5 sets of sanitized n˜ and 24
perturbed histograms, from which 5 sets of synthetic data were generated. Each synthesis
was allocated 1/5 of the total privacy budget, which was further split between sanitizing the
24 cells formed by w and sanitizing the histogram formed by z in a 1:1 ratio.
We examined the inferences on µ1,µ2, σ
2
1, σ
2
2, ρ, and the marginal probabilities Π = {Pr(w1 =
1),Pr(w2 = 1),Pr(w2 = 2),Pr(w3 = 1),Pr(w3 = 2),Pr(w3 = 3)} based on the synthetic data
sets. In each synthetic set l (l = 1, . . . , 5), Π was estimated by the corresponding sample
marginal probability Pˆl; µ1 and µ2 were estimated by the sample cell means z¯1,l and z¯2,l;
and Σ was estimated by the pooled variance-covariance Sl. The within-set variance was
estimated by Pˆl(1 − Pˆl)n−1 for Pˆl, S2j,ln−1 for z¯j (j = 1, 2),
(
S2j,l)
2(2(n− 1)−1 + κln−1
)
for
S2k,l, and (1−r2l )(n−2)−1 for the correlation between Z1 and Z2, respectively, where S21,l and
S22,l were the diagonal elements of Sl, κl was the excess kurtosis, and rl was derived from Sl.
Eqns (9) to (11) were then applied to obtain the final estimates of the parameters and the
95% CIs.
Figure 5 shows the results on the bias, RMSE, CP, and the 95% CI width of µ1 and Π.
The results on µ2, σ
2
1, σ
2
2, ρ are provided in Figures 6 and 7 in the Supplemental Materials.
The results are summarized as follows. 1) NP-DIPS performed better than MODIPS in the
inferences of µ1,µ2 and Π with smaller bias, similar or smaller RMSE, closer-to-nominal
coverage and slightly narrower CIs for  > e−2. 2) On the other hand, the MODIPS out-
performed the NP-DIPS approach in the inferences on σ21, σ
2
2, ρ with much smaller bias and
RMSE when  > e−1 and delivered nominal CP with reasonable CI widths when  > 1; the
NP-DIPS approach experienced severe undercoverage in all 3 variance/covariance compo-
nents and never reached the nominal level of 95% at all level of . The severe undercoverage
in the NP-DIPS at large  (where the injected noise is supposed to be small) is due to the
discretization in forming the histogram bins. The performance of the MODIPS was based
on the correct specification of the synthesis model (the GLOM). Mis-specification of the
synthesis model is expected to lead to worse results, which we will explore in simulation 4.
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Figure 5: The bias, RMSE, CP, and 95% CI width of Π and µ1 in simulation study 3. In the plot
of Π, each line presents a different marginal probability. In the plot of µ1, the lines represent the
min, med, max, Q1, Q3 of the true 24 cell means, respectively. MODIPS represents the model-
based differentially private data synthesis, NP-DIPS represents the Laplace sanitizer+perturbed
histogram method, MS is the traditional MS method without DP, and Ori is the original results
without perturbation.
4.3.2 Simulation study 4: SLOMAG Model
In this simulation, we first simulated z from the bivariate normal distribution f(Z) =
N(2)(µ,Σ) and then generated the categorical variables w from a sequence of logistic re-
gression models. We set µ = (µ1, µ2)
′ = 0, the variances of Z1 and Z2 at σ21 = σ
2
2 = 1, and
their correlation at ρ = 0.50. Zj (j = 1, 2) was truncated at [c0j = µj − 4σj, c1j = µj + 4σj]
to generate bounded data. w contains 3 categorical variables W1,W2,W3 with 2, 2, and 3
levels, respectively, and was generated from W1|Z1, Z2∼ Bern(pi1) with pi1 = e(1,Z1,Z2)β1(1 +
e(1,Z1,Z2)β1)−1, W2|Z1, Z2,W1 ∼ Bern(pi2) with pi2 = e(1,Z1,Z2,W1)β2(1 + e(1,Z1,Z2,W1)β2)−1, and
W3|Z1, Z2,W1,W2 ∼ Multinom(1, (pi31, pi32, pi33)), where pi31 = (1 + A + B)−1, pi32 = A(1 +
A + B)−1, pi33 = B(1 + A + B)−1, A = e(1,Z1,Z2,W1,W2)β3 , B = e(1,Z1,Z2,W1,W2)β4 ; and β1 =
(β01, β11, β21)
′ = (−1, 0.5,−1)′, β2 = (β02, β12, β22, β32)′ = (−2,−1, 1.5, 0.5)′, β3 = (β03, β13,
β23, β33, β43)
′ = (0,−2.5, 1, 0.5, 0.4)′, and β4 = (β04, β14, β24, β34, β44)′ = (0.1,−1,−0.5, 0, 1.5)′.
We ran 1000 repetitions, each sized at n = 1000.
The implementation of the NP-DIPS approach was straightforward. z was first discretized
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via the Scott’s rule to form a 2-way histogram (the number of histogram bins are presented
in Table 7), which was then combined with (w1,w2,w3) to form a 5-way cross-tabulation.
The counts from which were sanitized via the Laplace sanitizer with global sensitivity is 1,
from which 5 sets of synthetic data were generated.
The non-DP MS and the MODIPS and reply on the specification on a synthesis model.
In the case of the non-DP MS, an appropriate model can be identified without having to
worry about privacy costs. For MODIPS, if the identification of a suitable model is based on
previous knowledge and common practice, then no privacy is needed to be spent; however,
if the model selection procedure is based on the the data to be released, then the data
curator will have to allocate a certain portion of the total privacy budget to the model
selection procedure. Differentially private model selection is a separate research topic that
is beyond the scope of this paper. For simplicity, we assumed the correct SLOMAG model
was identified beforehand without using the current data set.
In the SLOMAG model, we employed priors f(µ,Σ) ∝ |Σ−1| on µ and Σ and assumed
f(β1,β2,β3,β4) = f(β1)f(β2)f(β3,β4). The joint posterior distribution of the parame-
ters can be factorized as f(Σ|z)f(µ|Σ, z)f(β1|z,w1)f(β2|z,w1,w2)f(β3,β4|z,w1,w2,w3),
where f(Σ|z) = Inv-Wishart(n,S), f(µ|Σ, z) = N(z¯, n−1Σ) (z¯ was the sample means of z,
and S = n−1
∑n
i=1(zi − z¯)(zi − z¯)′ was the sample covariance matrix of z), and
f(β1|w1, z) ∝ f(β1)
n∏
i=1
ewi1(1,zi1,zi2)β1
1 + e(1,zi1,zi2)β1
(12)
f(β2|w2,w1, z)∝ f(β2)
n∏
i=1
ewi2(1,zi1,zi2,wi1)β2
1+e(1,zi1,zi2,wi1)β2
(13)
f(β3,β4|w3,w2,w1, z) ∝
n∏
i=1
{(
1
1 + Ai +Bi
)I(wi3=1)
×
(
ewi3(1,zi1,zi2,wi1,wi2)β3
1 + Ai +Bi
)I(wi3=2)
×
(
ewi3(1,zi1,zi2,wi3,wi2)β4
1 + Ai +Bi
)I(wi3=3)}
f(β3,β4) =
eaiβ3+biβ4∏n
i=1(1 + Ai +Bi)
f(β3,β4), (14)
where ai = (
∑n
i=1I(wi3 =2),
∑n
i=1zi1I(wi3 =2),
∑n
i=1zi2I(wi3 =2),
∑n
i=1wi1I(wi3 =2),∑n
i=1wi2I(wi3 =2)), bi = (
∑n
i=1I(wi3 = 3),
∑n
i=1zi1I(wi3 = 3),
∑n
i=1zi2I(wi3 = 3),∑n
i=1wi1I(wi3 =3),
∑n
i=1wi2I(wi3 =3)), Ai=e
(1,zi1,zi2,wi1,wi2)β3 , and Bi=e
(1,zi1,zi2,wi1,wi2)β4 .
To synthesize z˜i for i = 1, ..., n in the traditional non-DP MS approach via the SLOMAG
model,we first drew Σ from f(Σ|z) = Inv-Wishart(n,S), and µ from f(µ|Σ, z) = N(z¯, n−1Σ),
and then simulated z˜i from f(z˜i|µ,Σ) = N(µ,Σ) given the drawn (Σ,µ). To synthesize w˜i =
(w˜i1, w˜i2, w˜i3), we assumed f(β1)f(β1)f(β3,β4) ∝ constant, and applied the Metropolis
algorithm to sample β1,β2,β3,β4 from their posterior distributions and, after checking
on the convergence of the MCMC chains (2 chains, a burn-in period of 1500, a thinning
period of 10, and 10,000 iterations to yield a total of 7,650 samples), simulated w˜i1, w˜i2 and
w˜i3 from f(w˜i1|β1,Σ, z˜), f(w˜i2|β2, w˜1i, z˜i), and f(w˜i3|β3,β4, w˜i2, w˜i1, z˜i), respectively. We
calculated the potential scale reduction factor (psrf) using the R package coda to check on
the convergence of the MCMC chains. In the Supplemental Materials, we provide the MCMC
trace plots from a random sample out of the 1000 repeats on β1 as an example.
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For the MODIPS approach, there were total 8 sets of quantities to be sanitized: z¯,S, and
3 sets of estimated regression coefficients βˆ1, βˆ2 and (βˆ3, βˆ4), implying the total privacy
budget per synthesis (/5) should be divided by 8. z¯ (2 components) and S (3 components)
were the Bayesian sufficient statistics associated with the posterior distributions of Σ and
µ. Since c1,j − c0,j = 8σ for j = 1, 2, the l1 global sensitivity was 8σn−1 for z¯j and (8σ)2n−1
for each entry in S. To obtain differentially private samples from the posterior distribu-
tions of β1,β2,β3 and β4 in Eqns (12) to (14), we implemented Algorithm 1 in Chaudhuri
& Monteleoni (2009). Specifically, denote by βˆ the optimizer of the loss function from a
logistic regression model with l2 regularization (tuning parameter λ) and normalized pre-
dictors x for all i = 1, . . . , n (per Euclidean norm ||x||i ≤ 1), then the differentially private
coefficient estimates are given by βˆ
∗
= βˆ + e, where the distribution of the noises e is
f(e) ∝ exp (−nλ||e||/2). In this simulation study, we added the noise e to a random draw
from the posterior distribution of the β instead of to the optimizer, which would be the
posterior mode. This is because the injected noise only depends on n, p and is independent
of the specific values in the data set as along as the specification of λ does not use the local
data. λ is often chosen by cross-validation if there is no privacy concern, but would cost
privacy otherwise. Chaudhuri et al. (2011) suggest two ways of selecting λ; using a separate
public data set, which does not cost privacy budget; or subsetting the data and then apply
the Exponential mechanism with the prediction accuracy as the scoring function to choose
λ (Algorithm 4 in Chaudhuri et al. (2011)). Here we assumed there existed a public data
set (which was simulated from the same joint distribution of X and W and attempted five
λ’s (0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.5 and 1) in each regression on this public data set. We found λ1, λ2, λ3
around 0.5 seemed to perform the best in terms of prediction accuracy, which was used as
the final λ’s in the MODIPS approach.
In summary, the steps for generating the differentially private data from the SLOMAG
model are as follow. 1) sanitize z¯ and S, draw µ and Σ from their posterior distributions
with the sanitized z¯∗ and S∗, and simulate z˜∗ from its posterior predictive distribution given
µ∗ and Σ∗. 2) Fit the l2 regularized logistic regression on w1 in the Bayesian framework
with the normalized predictor z′ and prior f(β1)
ind∼ N(0, λ−11 ); draw β1 from its posterior
distribution and sanitize it as outlined above; simulate w˜∗1 given the sanitized β
∗
1 and the
normalized sanitized z˜∗
′
from the first step. 3) Fit the l2 regularized logistic regression on
w2 in the Bayesian framework with the normalized predictor (z
′,w′1) and prior f(β2)
ind∼
N(0, λ−12 ); draw β2 from its posterior distribution and sanitize it as outlined above; simulate
w˜∗2 given the sanitized β
∗
2 and the normalized (z˜
∗′ , w˜∗
′
1 ) from the first two steps. 4) Fit
the l2 regularized multinomial logistic regression on w3 in the Bayesian framework with the
normalized predictor (z′,w′1,w
′
2) and prior f(β3,β4)
ind∼ N(0, λ−13 ); draw (β3,β4) from their
posterior distributions and sanitize them as outlined above; simulate w˜∗3 given the sanitized
(β∗3,β
∗
4) and the normalized (w˜
∗
1, w˜
∗
2, z˜
∗) from the previous three steps. Similar to the non-
DP MS case, we calculated the psrf to check on the convergence of the MCMC chains. In
the Supplemental Materials, we provide the MCMC trace plots from a random sample out
of the 1000 repeats on β1 as an example.
To check on the impact of the mis-specification of synthesis models in MODIPS on the in-
ferences from the synthetic data, we also synthesized data from a mis-specificated model.
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There are many possible models for a mixture of categorical and continuous variables, for
example, assuming independence among (x,w), dropping a predictor in one of the logistic re-
gression equations above, switching the order of the logistic regression sequence, or applying
the GLOM, which are all mis-specifications in this simulation. For the purposes of check-
ing on the impact of the mis-specification of synthesis models, it would make no essential
difference which misspecified model to be compared with the correct specification. There-
fore, we used the GLOM as a representation for the model misspecification. The Bayesian
GLOM in this case was similar to that in Sec 4.3.1, with the multinomial distribution on
(W1,W2,W3) (12 cells) and the bivariate Gaussian assumption on (Z1, Z2) in each of the 12
cells, to generate 5 synthetic data sets. To examine how bad the misspecification could be in
terms of inferences, the supplementary materials present a posterior predictive check from
fitting the SLOMAG and the GLOM models to the original data. Though the GLOM led to
biased synthetic data, this mis-specification brought some potential side-benefit in terms of
privacy protection. Specifically, the misspecification could offer more privacy guarantee as
it provides another type of noise that deviated the synthetic information from the original.
However, the additional privacy protection, if there is any, can be difficult to quantify or
even untraceable in the framework of DP. As a result, the comparison in statistical utility
below from the synthetic data might be unfair to the GLOM model as the actual privacy it
provided could be more than the nominal -DP, which the other synthesizer used.
We examined the inferences on Σ,µ, and β1,β2,β3,β4. µ1 and µ2 in synthetic data set l
(l = 1, . . . , 5) were estimated by the sample means z¯
(l)
1 and z¯
(l)
2 , and Σ was estimated by the
sample covariance S(l). The corresponding within-set variance was estimated by (S2k)
(l)n−1
for z¯
(l)
k (k = 1, 2),
(
(S2k)
(l))2(2(n− 1)−1 + κ(l)n−1) for the marginal variances of z1 and z2,
and (1− (r(l))2)(n− 2)−1 for the correlation between Z1 and Z2, respectively, where (S21)(l),
(S22)
(l) were the diagonal elements of S(l), κ(l) was the excess kurtosis, and rl was derived
from S(l). The regression coefficients β were estimated using the logistf function with
the Firth’s bias reduction method in the R package logistf along with the corresponding
estimated variance estimates. Eqns (9) to (11) were then applied to obtain the final estimates
of the parameters and the 95% CIs in each DIPS approach.
Due to space limit, we present the results on the bias, log(RMSE), CP, and log(95% CI
width) for β2 and β3 in Figures 6 and 7; the results on µ1, µ2, σ
2
1, σ
2
2, ρ, β1, and β4 are
available in the Supplemental Materials. For very small values of  = e−4 to e−2, the logistic
regression based on the synthetic data from the MODIPS approach fail to converge thus
the results were not available for plotting. The results are summarized as follows. 1) First,
as expected, MODIPS-Wrong failed to capture the original information due to the model
mis-specification (large bias and undercover coverage). 2) Overall, the biases for MODIPS-
Correct got smaller and were close zero after  > e−1 ≈ 0.368, whereas the biases from
the NP-DIPS approach did not seem to diminish even at large . However, the bias in the
MODIPS-Correct was unstable and larger than the other methods when  was small (not
plotted). 3) The RMSE values in general were large compared to the original RMSE values
across all DIPS methods. 4) The MODIPS-Correct approach produced coverage at or above
the nominal level of 95% for  > e−1 at the cost of wide CIs. The CP results from the NP-
DIPS approach varies across parameters: some experienced severe under-coverage across all
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Figure 6: The bias, log(RMSE), 95% CP, and log(95% CI width) for β2 in simulation study
4. MODIPS represents the model-based differentially private synthesis, NP-DIPS represents the
Laplace sanitizer + perturbed histogram method, MS is the traditional multiple synthesis method
without DP, and Ori is the original results without any perturbation.
values of  or only at small values of , some had close to 95% coverage across the board. The
CI width varied little with  in the NP-DIPS approach. 5) For µ1 and µ2, the bias, RMSE,
and CI width of the estimates were smaller in the NP-DIPS approach than those in the
MODIPS-Correct approach for  < e, and were similar for  > e; and both provided about
95% CP. Although the RMSE and CI width decreased as  increased for MODIPS-Wrong,
the bias and CP deviated significantly from the original values. 6) For Σ, the NP-DIPS and
MODIPS–Wrong approaches experienced severe under-coverage in all 3 components (σ21, σ
2
2,
and ρ) regardless of . The former suffered for the same reason given in simulation study
3 (discretization and uniform sampling from each histogram bin). The MODIPS–Correct
provided nominal CP for σ21, σ
2
2, and ρ and had smaller bias and RMSE than the NP-DIPS
approach for  > e−2, at the cost of wide CIs when  < e.
Compared to simulation study 3 which also had a mixture of continuous and categorical
variables, the results in simulation study 4 were generally worse for both the NP-DIPS and
the MODIPS approaches, but in different ways. The identification of statistics to sanitize
with the SLOMAG model was less obvious and the inferences based on the synthetic data
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Figure 7: The bias, log(RMSE), 95% CP, and log(95% CI width) for β3 in simulation study
4. MODIPS represents the model-based differentially private synthesis, NP-DIPS represents the
Laplace sanitizer + perturbed histogram method, MS is the traditional multiple synthesis method
without DP, and Ori is the original results without any perturbation.
were less stable in simulation 4 for the MODIPS approach, probably due to the direct
sanitization of the likelihood functions. For the NP-DIPS approach, the discretization and
sanitization procedure was the same between simulations 3 and 4, but seemed to affect
the inferences from the SLOMAG model more than those from the GLOM. The different
results from the two simulation studies suggest that even though the NP-DIPS approach
was nonparametric, inferences based on the synthesized data in certain models can be more
sensitive than others.
5 Case Study
We apply several DIPS approaches to a real-life data set to assess the feasibility these ap-
proaches in generating useful synthetic data sets in practice. We used the fertility data set
from Gil et al. (2012) in a study of 100 student volunteers at the University of Alicante. Each
participant provided a semen sample after 3 to 6 days of sexual abstinence, and answered
a questionnaire about their life habits and health status. The attributes in the data are
summarized in Table 3 (there were originally 35 variables in Gil et al. (2012), but only 10
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variables were publicly available on the UCI Machine Learning Repository). The data set
is useful for studying risk factors possibly associated with the fertility rate. On the other
hand, sharing the data set publically could cause privacy concerns as some of the variables
such as “diagnosis of seminal quality” are generally regarded as sensitive information.
Variable Values
Season of the analysis Winter, Spring, Summer, Fall
Age at the time of analysis (years) 18 ∼ 36
Childish diseases Yes, No
Accident or serious trauma Yes, No
Surgical intervention Yes, No
High fevers in the last year < 3 months ago, > 3 months ago, no
Frequency of alcohol consumption
several times a day, every day, several times
a week, once a week, hardly ever or never
Smoking habit never, occasional, daily
Number of hours sitting per day 1 ∼ 16
Diagnosis of seminal quality normal, altered
Table 3: Variables from the fertility data in Gil et al. (2012).
The main goal of Gil et al. (2012) was to compare the performance of three machine learn-
ing techniques (decision trees, Multilayer Perception, and Support Vector Machine/SVM) in
predicting the seminal quality given various predictors. The authors found that Multilayer
Perception and SVM outperformed decision trees with SVM slightly more accurate. There-
fore, we only employed the SVM in this case study. Specifically, we first randomly split
the original data into a training set of 80 subjects and a test set of 20 subjects. The same
test set was then used to evaluate the predictive power of the SVMs constructed from the
synthetic data via different DIPS approaches (so to avoid testing the SVM on a test data
that was synthesized via the same DIPS approach for generating the training data). Since
this analysis did not involve statistical inferences, we generated a single synthetic data set
with  = e1 = 2.72, a practically small and reasonable privacy budget.
We employed the Laplace sanitizer (ND-DIPS) and the MODIPS (P-DIPS) approach. In the
Laplace sanitizer, we first discretized the two continuous variables (age and hours sitting)
into a 2D histogram, then sanitized the cell counts n from the full cross tabulation of the 10
variables with the additive noise from Lap(0, −1). For the MODIPS approach, the first step
was to select an appropriate synthesis model. There were 8 categorical variables with some
of them having sparse cell counts in their marginal distribution (e.g., in alcohol consumption,
there was only 1 person in the categories of several times a day and every day, respectively);
both of the two continuous variables (age and hours sitting) deviated obviously from Gaussian
distributions. Given the small sample size (n = 80 in the training set), the GLOM is not
expected to work well as there would be too many empty or sparse cells from the full cross-
tabulation of the categorical variables; the SLOMAG model could generate noisy synthetic
data based on its performance in the simulation study 4 where the sample size (n = 1000) was
much higher than this case study with a much smaller cross-tabulation of the categorical
variables. We also tried the second-order mixed graphical model approach on the data,
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and the prediction was not good even without DP perturbation. All taken together, we
discretized the two continuous variables and then fitted a saturated log-linear model. The
Bayesian sufficient statistics was n. We first sanitized n via the Laplace mechanism with
scale −1 to obtain n∗. Given s∗, we drew pi∗ from f(pi∗|n∗) = D(α + n∗), then x˜ from
f(x˜|pi∗) = Multinom(n,pi∗). We ran 100 repetitions.
As a benchmark, we run the PrivateSVM (Algorithm 2 in Rubinstein et al. (2009)), an
approach designed specifically for releasing differentially private SVM results. PrivateSVM
first applies the SVM to the original data and then returns the noisy weight vector via the
Laplace mechanism. Calculating the global sensitivity of the weight vector for PrivateSVM
is nontrivial. We employed the linear kernel for PrivateSVM, the global sensitivity based
which is 4LCκ
√
F/n (Rubinstein et al. 2009), where L = 1 is the linear kernel, C = 1
is cost of constraints violation (the C-constant of the regularization term in the Lagrange
formulation in SVM), κ is the upper bound for the linear kernel (9 with the normalized data
in this case), F is the number of features (9 in this case), and n is the number of observations
in the training sample (80 in this case). Thus, the total global sensitivity is 1.35.
If the DIPS approaches performed similarly to PrivateSVM in classification accuracy, DIPS
would be preferable since the data user would have the individual-level synthetic data whereas
PrivateSVM only provides a differentially private SVM. When constructing the SVM on the
synthetic data, we employed the svm command in R package e1071 with kernel="linear"
and a 5-fold cross validation.
Predicted based on
Observed Original data PrivateSVM Laplace sanitizer MODIPS
+ - + - + - + -
+ 0 3 0.84 2.16 1.04 1.96 1.50 1.50
- 0 17 4.87 12.13 5.11 11.89 8.51 8.49
CR† 17/20 = 85% 12.97/20 = 64.9% 12.93/20 = 64.7% 9.99/20 = 50.0%
†CR: consistency rate
Table 4: Accuracy of SVMs constructed from PrivateSVM approach and synthetic data via the
Laplace Sanitizer and MODIPS approaches when  = e.
Table 4 shows the averaged confusion matrices and the classification accuracy on the 20
testing cases over the 100 repeats by the SVMs constructed from PrivateSVM as well as
the synthetic data from the Laplace sanitizer and MODIPS approaches. As expected, the
prediction power of the SVMs constructed on the synthetic data via the Laplace sanitizer
and the MODIPS approach decreased (64.7% and 50.0%, respectively) from the original
SVM (85%) at the privacy budget of  = 2.72, a cost we had to pay to achieve some level of
privacy. The Laplace sanitizer was no worse than PrivateSVM (64.9%), and the data user
will have access to the full synthetic data with the DIPS approach, performing any analyses
as if they had the original data. The significant decreases (20%) in predictive accuracy
from the original results in all 3 differentially private approaches might have something to
do with the small sample size and the unbalancedness between the two categories of the
outcome (88:12 normal vs. altered). On the other hand, there might exist more efficient
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DIPS methods that can better preserve the original info while satisfying DP, a topic we will
continue to work on.
We also examined summary statistics to further assess the synthetic data quality. Table
5 summarizes the continuous variables (Age at the time of analysis and Number of hours
sitting per day, which are refered to as Age and Hours, respectively) by the mean and SD,
and the categories variables by the averaged total variation distance in the 1-, 2-way, 3-way,
and 8-way (full) cross-tabulations, respectively, constructed based on the synthetic vs the
original data. In summary, 1) for both the Laplace sanitizer and the MODIPS approach, the
mean and standard deviation of the two continuous variables were close to the original data’s
values; 2) the averaged total variation distances in all the cross-tabulations were consistently
smaller with the Laplace sanitizer than the MODIPS approach.
statistic attribute original data Laplace santizer MODIPS
mean (SD) age 0.67 (0.12) 0.66 (0.14) 0.66 (0.14)
hours 0.41 (0.19) 0.44 (0.21) 0.50 (0.29)
total variation
distance
(TVD)
1-way table — 0.228 0.250
2-way table — 0.353 0.379
3-way table — 0.311 0.330
8-way table — 0.451 0.483
† TVD = t−1
∑t
j=1 |p∗j − pj |1, where t is the number of tables, pj and p∗j represent the vector
of cell probabilities in table j constructed from the original and synthetic data, respectively.
Table 5: Some summary statistics on the synthetic data
6 Discussion
We reviewed different DIPS methods for synthesizing differentially private individual-level
data and compared some DIPS methods empirically through simulation studies and a real-
life case study on the utility and inferential properties of the synthetic data generated by
the DIPS methods. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that compares the
inferential properties of DIPS approaches across various types and sizes of data.
The NP-DIPS approaches are robust given that they do not impose model or distribution
assumptions on a given data set. However, most NP-DIPS approaches require some degree
of discretization on numerical attributes. When the number of attributes p is large, an
important question to ask is whether there exists a “consistent” high-dimensional histogram
density estimator fn for the underlying true density f for a given sample size n, even before
the employment of a DP technique. It is known that the number of bins of a high-dimensional
histogram grows exponentially with dimension p, and the rate of decrease of the mean
integrated squared error E||(fn− f)||22 degrades rapidly as p increases compared to the ideal
parametric rate O(n) (Scott 2015). In addition, when p increase, most of the hypercube
bins in the high-dimensional histogram become empty and the histogram will be rough and
provides reasonable estimates only near the mode and away from the tails. When there are
correlations among the variables, smaller bin widths are required to “track” the correlations
(implying more bins), and the asymptotic mean integrated squared error is always larger than
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the independent case. In summary, in high-dimensional histograms, the variance and bias
trade-off is not well accomplished unless n is large. If the original high-dimensional histogram
is already not a good estimator for the distribution of the data, it is not meaningful to further
sanitize it. Additionally, inferences based on the synthetic data via histogram-based NP-
DIPS approaches are affected by how the histogram bins are formed. There exists theoretical
work in the computer science community that examines the relationship between the sample
size n and the accuracy of p binary proportion where the accuracy is defined as how close the
sanitized histogram to the original and does not involve drawing inferences about population
parameters. For example, the average l1 error of answering p 1-way binary proportions has a
lower bound of Ω(p/(n)) (Hardt & Talwar 2010); and the maximum l1 error from answering
p binary proportion given n has a upper bound of Ω(p log(p)/(n)) (Steinke & Ullman 2017).
The P-DIPS approaches, on the other hand, often require distributional assumptions and
model building, and thus are subject to appropriate model mis-specification. None of the
P-DIPS procedures we have examined (except for PrivBayes in Zhang et al. (2014)) have
the inherent model-selection component, implying they are applied after a suitable model
is identified. Broadly speaking, there are two model selection scenarios – one costs privacy
budget and the other does not. Specifically, if the model is chosen not using the knowledge
in the current data, but based on previous studies and common practice, then no privacy
needs to be spent. If the synthesis model is selected via a selection procedure using the
data to be released, then it costs privacy and we will need to split the privacy budget be-
tween model selection and data synthesis. The current research work on differentially private
model selection focuses on feature selection the setting of a certain model type, such as Kifer
et al. (2012), Smith & Thakurta (2013), Lei et al. (2018) for linear regression; and Zhang
et al. (2014) for Bayesian networks. More research will be needed in differentially privately
selecting among models that do not have to be of the same type, maybe by perturbing model
selection criteria such as AIC or BIC. Meanwhile, to mitigate the concern on model specifi-
cation or when there are several plausible models, we incorporated the model averaging idea
into the synthetic data generation, which also helps loosening the restriction the dependency
of the synthetic data on a single synthesis model.
An obvious drawback for all DIPS approaches is that the data user will not know how much
the results based on the synthetic data deviate from those if they had access to the original
data. If the differentially private synthetic data contain too much noise, the decisions made
based on the analysis of the synthetic might be improper or wrong. Barrientos et al. (2017)
proposed a differentially privately mechanism to release the test statistic and p-value from
testing a regression coefficient against 0 from a linear regression model. Their numerical
results suggest the sign of the test statistic and the conclusion of the hypothesis test have
a high probability of being consistent with the original results, it is then suggested the
approach can be used to validate the linear regression analysis based on synthetic data from
a DIPS method. The validation system hinted in Barrientos et al. (2017) is developed by
Barrientos et al. (2018) in a more comprehensive and integrated fashion using the U.S. federal
government employee longitudinal data as an example. Specifically, the system has three
components: 1) release synthetic data generated from a joint distribution of the data; 2)verify
/validate the statistical utility of a certain analysis (query) by comparing the results based on
the synthetic data with the query result released by a differentially private mechanism; and
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3) provide the raw/confidential data to approved data users via secure remote access. In the
examples given in both papers, all the given privacy budget is spent on testing or verifying
a single query result, while the reality is that a data user is often interested in estimating
more than parameters. From a DP perspective, then the total privacy budget will have to be
split among all queries to be verified, leading to potentially a large amount noised injected
per query and diminished values of a validation system. In addition, the synthesis in the
validation system mentioned in Barrientos et al. (2018) does not have to be differentially
private (and is not in the example given in the paper), that needs another disclosure risk
assessment step on the released synthetic data, which replies on strong assumption and can
be be ad-hoc as compared to the robustness of the DP concept. In addition, since DP aims to
cover the worst-case scenario which means the statistical utility of the query result obtained
via a differentially private mechanism can be further away from the original than that based
on the synthetic data without DP. In other words, a significant discrepancy between the two
as suggested in Barrientos et al. (2018) does not necessarily invalidate one, or the other.
An alternative to enhancing data users’ confidence in synthetic data is to develop more
efficient DP mechanisms at the same privacy cost but with less noise injected, such as
taking into account the correlations among the statistics during sanitization so that the
privacy budget is not spent on overlapping information, or optimizing the privacy budget
allocation scheme when the sequential composition is in effect. In all the simulation studies
we conducted, statistics were sanitized independently, implying that redundant noises were
introduced on correlated statistics. Accounting for the correlations among the statistics will
cut the necessary noises to satisfy DP, improving the efficiency of the DIPS procedures. In
addition, we could always employ a relaxed version of DP (such as aDP or pDP) to generate
synthetic data as long as there is consensus the relaxed DP still provide satisfactory privacy
protection. Conceptually, all the DIPS methods introduced and examined in the paper can
be implemented with relaxed DP assuming the appropriate sanitizer is employed.
Some future work could also involve developing a system that compares the various DP
definitions, mechanisms, and algorithms, and recommends DP mechanisms/algorithms to
users. Given the wealth of DP methods, a data user might face difficulty in selecting the
most well-suited DP approach for his/her data, including considerations on the practicality
and computational limitations of those DP methods. Hay et al. (2016) attempted to address
the issue proposing DPBench as approach for standardized evaluation of privacy algorithm,
as well as valuable observations and findings after comparing various data-dependent and
data-independent DP methods. However, their work is limited to 1- and 2-dimensional
range queries. Motivated by DPBench, Kotsogiannis et al. (2017) developed Pythia, a meta-
algorithm that measures the input features to select a particular DP method. Similarly,
Pythia is limited to releasing certain queries such as histograms, range queries, and Naive
Bayes classifiers.
The choice of  (and the parameter that quantifies the relaxation of the strict -DP if a relaxed
version of DP is used) remains an open question. The concept of the -DP is abstract and
does not easily relate to practically relevant measures of privacy, making the justification
of a socially acceptable of  difficult. Based on the literature we have surveyed as well as
the observations on the statistical utility from the simulation studies and the case study we
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conducted, it seems that  in the neighborhood 1 (which is neither too small nor too large)
seems to produce synthetic data of acceptable statistical utility. Additionally,  = 1 has
been explored frequently in experiments run in the literature. We believe more research and
further investigation on this issue will help to narrow down to a generally acceptable set of
 values.
The ultimate goal of developing DIPS approaches is to employ them for public data release
in practice. The US Census Bureau aims to employ DP in major data products like the
2020 Census of Population and House, the Economic Census, and the annual American
Community Surveys (Abowd et al. 2017). On the other hand, real-life data can be large in
size, complex in structure, and have a large number of attributes of various types. In addition,
issues such as missing data, sparse data, data entry errors, among others further complicate
the application of DIPS. There is still a huge gap from the research work on DP to the wide
practical application of DP. The status quo is that a large body of DP literature focus only on
categorical/binary attributes and ignore missing data or data entry errors. Machanavajjhala
et al. (2008) demonstrated that the Multinomial-Dirichlet synthesizer led to poor inferences
due to data sparsity when releasing the commuting patterns of the US population data
and proposed combining distance-based coarsening with a probabilistic pruning algorithm
and preserving ( = 8.6, δ = 10−5)-pDP. The relatively low classification accuracy based
on synthetic data in our case study in Section 5 also suggests that direct application of
a DIPS approach without any modification might not accommodate real-life situation well
enough. On the other hand, local DP has been employed by big tech companies (e.g., Google
and Apple) to collect users data. Though it seems to be a successful application, multiple
sources suggest the privacy budget  employed by Apple to collect users data on mobile
devices is too high to be acceptable for privacy protection (Tang et al. 2017, Orr 2017).
Although Apple has provided some information about their DP approach, the information
is vague. Tang et al. (2017) attempted to replicate the method without success and stated
that “We applaud Apple’s deployment of DP for its bold demonstration of feasibility of
innovation while guaranteeing rigorous privacy. However, we argue that in order to claim
the full benefits of differentially private data collection, Apple must give full transparency of
its implementation and privacy loss choices, enable user choice in areas related to privacy
loss, and set meaningful defaults on the daily and device lifetime privacy loss permitted.”
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Supplemental Materials for “Comparative Study of Differentially Private Data Synthesis
Methods” by Claire Bowen and Fang Liu
This file contains the supplementary materials to accompany the paper “Comparative Study
of Differentially Private Data Synthesis Methods” with additional results from the four
simulation studies.
• Simulation study 1: Table 1 shows the proportions of usable simulation repeats for
all DIPS methods. A usable simulation repeat is defined as a simulated data set that
leads to a synthetic data set that contains at least one of each of the two levels of the
binary variable. Figure 1 depicts the zoomed-in inferential results when pi = 0.50.
• Simulation study 2: Table 2 shows the summary statistics for the number of histogram
bins used in histogram-based DIPS methods. Figures 2 and 5 depict the inferential
results of µ and σ2 when the bounds of the data were [µ− 4σ, µ + 4σ] (the main text
contains the results on data with asymmetric bounds [µ− 3σ, µ+ 4σ]).
• Simulation study 3: Table 3 contains the true values of µ1, µ2, and pi for the 24
cells used for simulating the data. Tables 4 and 5 show the summary statistics for
the number of observations in the 24 cells formed by the categorical variables w,
and summary statistics for the number of 2-dimensional histogram bins formed by
the continuous variables (z1, z2) in each of the 24 cell (for the histogram-based DIPS
methods), respectively. Figures 6 and 7 depict the inferential results on µ2, ρ, σ
2
1, and
σ22.
• Simulation study 4: Table 7 shows the summary statistics for the number of 2-
dimensional histogram bins formed by the continuous variables (z1, z2) in each of the
12 cells formed by the categorical variables w in the histogram-based DIPS methods.
Figure 8 depicts some MCMC trace plots from the MS and the MODIPS-correct ap-
proaches using β1 as example in one repeat. Figures 9 to 11 show the inferential results
for parameters µ1, µ2, σ
2
1, σ
2
2, ρ, β1, and β4.
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In Table 1, an usable simulation repeat is defined as a simulated data set that leads to a
synthetic data set that contains both levels of the binary variable. When a simulation repeat
is unusable, the simulation is discarded since a data user would most likely not release such
a data set. However, we presented Table 1 to demonstrate how often unusable repeats would
occur for certain DIPS methods. The only DIPS method that had unusable repeats within
our tested  values was the Laplace Sanitizer.
Table 1: The proportion of usable simulation repeats (out of 5000) based on the synthetic data via
the Laplace sanitizer in Simulation 1. Only the proportions ln() = −4,−2, 0 are presented since
ln() > 0 generated 100% usable repeats.
ln() -4 -2 0
n = 40, pi = 0.15 0.9532 0.9852 0.9998
n = 100, pi = 0.15 0.9684 0.9954 1.0000
n = 1000, pi = 0.15 0.9972 1.0000 1.0000
n = 40, pi = 0.25 0.9566 0.9900 1.0000
n = 100, pi = 0.25 0.9708 0.9984 1.0000
n = 1000, pi = 0.25 0.9992 1.0000 1.0000
n = 40, pi = 0.50 0.9574 0.9952 1.0000
n = 100, pi = 0.50 0.9754 0.9998 1.0000
n = 1000, pi = 0.50 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
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Figure 1: Zoomed-in results on the bias, RMSE, and 95% CP when pi = 0.50 in Simulation 1.
MODIPS represents the model-based differentially private synthesis, LAP represents the Laplace
synthesizer, MD represents the Multinomial-Dirichlet synthesizer, BB-MR represents the Binomial-
Beta McClure-Reiter synthesizer, MS is the traditional non-DP MS, and Ori is the original results
without any perturbation.
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Table 2: Summary statistics for the number of the histogram bins across 5000 simulations repeats
in simulation study 2.
Scenario Min Mean Median Max
n = 40, σ2 = 1, 4, 9 5 7.46 7 12
n = 100, σ2 = 1, 4, 9 8 9.85 10 13
n = 1000, σ2 = 1, 4, 9 19 20.54 21 22
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Figure 2: The bias and RMSE of µ in simulation study 2 when the data bounds were [µ− 4σ, µ+
4σ]. MODIPS represents the model-based differentially private data synthesis, PERT represents
the perturbed histogram method, SMOOTH represents the smoothed histogram method, MS is the
traditional MS method without DP, and Ori is the original results without perturbation.
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Figure 3: The 95% CP and 95% CI width of µ in simulation study 2 when the data bounds were [µ−
4σ, µ+ 4σ]. MODIPS (with the boundary inflated truncation procedure) represents the model-based
differentially private data synthesis, PERT represents the perturbed histogram method, SMOOTH
represents the smoothed histogram method, MS is the traditional MS method without DP, and Ori
is the original results without perturbation.
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Figure 4: The relative bias and scaled RMSE of σ2 in simulation study 2 when the bounds were
[µ − 4σ, µ + 4σ]. MODIPS represents the model-based differentially private data synthesis, PERT
represents the perturbed histogram method, SMOOTH represents the smoothed histogram method,
MS is the traditional MS method without DP, and Ori is the original results without perturbation.
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Figure 5: The 95% CP and scaled 95% CI width of σ2 in simulation study 2 when the bounds were
[µ−4σ, µ+4σ]. MODIPS (with boundary inflated truncation procedure) represents the model-based
differentially private data synthesis, PERT represents the perturbed histogram method, SMOOTH
represents the smoothed histogram method, MS is the traditional MS method without DP, and Ori
is the original results without perturbation.
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Table 3: The true values of µ1, µ2, and pi for the 24 cells in simulation study 3
Cell µ1 µ2 pi
1 1.371 -0.565 0.041
2 0.363 0.633 0.076
3 0.404 -0.106 0.024
4 1.512 -0.095 0.062
5 2.018 -0.063 0.045
6 1.305 2.287 0.041
7 -1.389 -0.279 0.038
8 -0.133 0.636 0.007
9 -0.284 -2.656 0.064
10 -2.440 1.320 0.064
11 -0.307 -1.781 0.031
12 -0.172 1.215 0.048
13 1.895 -0.430 0.053
14 -0.257 -1.763 0.007
15 0.460 -0.640 0.021
16 0.455 0.705 0.065
17 1.035 -0.609 0.070
18 0.505 -1.717 0.012
19 -0.784 -0.851 0.024
20 -2.414 0.036 0.028
21 0.206 -0.361 0.048
22 0.758 -0.727 0.011
23 -1.368 0.433 0.058
24 -0.811 1.444 0.062
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Table 4: Summary statistics for the number of observations in the 24 cells formed by the categorical
variables across the 5000 repeats in simulation 3.
Cell Min Mean Median Max
1 20 41.05 41 68
2 49 75.86 76 106
3 8 24.07 24 45
4 36 61.92 62 89
5 24 44.81 45 68
6 21 40.94 41 64
7 17 38.01 38 61
8 1 6.993 7 17
9 38 63.96 64 94
10 30 64.05 64 91
11 12 31.03 31 59
12 23 48.01 48 76
13 30 53.01 53 81
14 1 6.978 7 18
15 6 21.03 21 39
16 38 64.94 65 97
17 42 70.15 70 105
18 1 12 12 29
19 8 24.03 24 43
20 7 28.06 28 48
21 27 48.17 48 71
22 1 10.99 11 24
23 30 57.95 58 86
24 36 61.98 62 93
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Table 5: Summary statistics for the bin number in the 2-dimensional histogram formed by z1 and
z2 in the 24 cells formed by the categorical cells (used in the NP-DIPS method) across the 5000
repeats in simulation 3.
Cell Min Mean Median Max
1 36 37.78 36 49
2 49 51.09 49 64
3 25 34.39 36 36
4 42 49.01 49 56
5 36 42.06 42 49
6 36 37.78 36 49
7 36 36.38 36 49
8 16 16.04 16 20
9 49 49.04 49 56
10 49 49.04 49 56
11 36 36.00 36 36
12 36 45.60 49 49
13 36 48.49 49 49
14 16 16.04 16 20
15 25 28.59 30 36
16 49 49.06 49 56
17 49 49.37 49 64
18 20 25.00 25 25
19 25 34.39 36 36
20 25 35.97 36 36
21 36 45.60 49 49
22 16 24.92 25 25
23 36 48.97 49 56
24 42 49.01 49 56
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Figure 6: The bias, RMSE, 95% CP, and 95% CI width of µ2 and ρ in simulation study 3.
MODIPS represents the model-based differentially private data synthesis, NP-DIPS represents the
Laplace sanitizer + perturbed histogram method, MS is the traditional MS method without DP, and
Ori is the original results without perturbation.
60
𝜎1
2 = 1
ln(𝜖) ln(𝜖)
𝜎2
2 = 1
𝐛
𝐢𝐚
𝐬
𝐑
𝐌
𝐒
𝐄
𝐂
𝐏
𝐂
𝐈
𝐰
𝐢𝐝
𝐭𝐡
𝐌𝐎𝐃𝐈𝐏𝐒
𝐍𝐏 − 𝐃𝐈𝐏𝐒
𝐌𝐒
𝐎𝐑𝐈
Figure 7: The bias, RMSE, 95% CP, and 95% CI width of σ21 and σ
2
2 in simulation study 3.
MODIPS represents the model-based differentially private data synthesis, NP-DIPS represents the
Laplace sanitizer + perturbed histogram method, MS is the traditional MS method without DP, and
Ori is the original results without perturbation.
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Table 6: Summary statistics for the number of observations in the 12 cells formed by the categorical
cells across the 1000 repeats in simulation 4.
Cell Min Mean Median Max
1 107 157.7 158 200
2 151 202.3 202 245
3 154 197 197 249
4 50 77.65 78 113
5 33 54.59 54 84
6 3 14.72 15 29
7 36 59.18 59 89
8 65 94.29 94 126
9 67 98.46 98 136
10 8 212 21 39
11 4 17.83 18 35
12 0 5.30 5 16
Table 7: Summary statistics for the number of 2-dimensional histogram bins formed by the two
continuous variables (z1, z2) in each of the 12 cells by the categorical variables w (needed in the
NP-DIPS approach) in simulation study 4.
Cell Min Mean Median Max
1 49 65.23 64 81
2 56 64.53 64 81
3 64 78.78 81 100
4 36 50.90 49 64
5 9 19.81 16 30
6 64 79.23 81 100
7 36 47.67 49 64
8 64 77.26 81 90
9 16 25.74 25 36
10 0 13.89 16 25
11 36 47.71 49 64
12 16 26.35 25 36
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Table 8 presents the Bayesian p-values for the sample marginal probabilities w, the sample
means and variance-covariance of z from the two models fitted to the original data over the
100 repeats. A Bayesian p-value that is close to 0 or 1 implies the posterior predicted value
of that statistic based on the Bayesian model deviates from the observed value significantly,
or the model is a not good fit for the data. The p-values from the SLOMAG for all the
examined statistics ranged from ∼ 0.45 to ∼ 0.55. The p-values from the GLOM were
acceptable (∼ 0.5) in most of the examined statistics but not in the two sample variances s21
and s22 (p-values > 0.99) or the sample correlation r (p-values ranged from 0 to 0.59 with a
median of 0.051). These results suggested that the SLOGMAG model was a better fit than
the GLOM.
model statistics min Q1 mean med Q3 max
correct z¯1 0.455 0.491 0.501 0.501 0.510 0.544
(SLOMAG) z¯2 0.470 0.488 0.500 0.501 0.510 0.546
s21 0.474 0.497 0.507 0.505 0.515 0.552
s22 0.468 0.495 0.506 0.503 0.520 0.543
r 0.465 0.492 0.501 0.500 0.511 0.540
Pr(W1 = 1) 0.436 0.475 0.485 0.485 0.496 0.528
Pr(W2 = 1) 0.451 0.474 0.483 0.482 0.493 0.515
Pr(W3 = 1) 0.448 0.474 0.488 0.488 0.497 0.533
Pr(W3 = 2) 0.452 0.477 0.486 0.485 0.495 0.519
wrong z¯1 0.463 0.491 0.502 0.502 0.512 0.544
(GLOM) z¯2 0.458 0.490 0.500 0.500 0.511 0.543
s21 0.991 0.998 0.998 0.999 1.000 1.000
s22 0.993 0.998 0.999 0.999 1.000 1.000
r 0.000 0.020 0.107 0.051 0.148 0.587
Pr(W1 = 1) 0.434 0.479 0.490 0.490 0.499 0.527
Pr(W2 = 1) 0.449 0.479 0.490 0.492 0.501 0.522
Pr(W3 = 1) 0.446 0.476 0.488 0.489 0.498 0.518
Pr(W3 = 2) 0.434 0.478 0.488 0.488 0.497 0.531
Table 8: Bayesian p-values on selected statistics with the right and wrong model specification.
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Figure 8: Sample MCMC trace plots for β1. MS is the traditional multiple synthesis method without
DP, MODIPS-Correct is the DIPS method based on the SLOMAG model with the l2 regularizer on
β1 at λ = 0.50.
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Figure 9: Bias, RMSE, CP, and 95% CI width of µ1 and µ2 in simulation study 4. MODIPS
represents the model-based differentially private data synthesis, NP-DIPS represents the Laplace
sanitizer + perturbed histogram method, MS is the traditional MS method without DP, and Ori is
the original results without perturbation.
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Figure 10: Bias, RMSE, 95% CP, and 95% CI width of σ21, σ
2
2, and ρ in simulation study 4.
MODIPS represents the model-based differentially private data synthesis, PERT represents the per-
turbed histogram method, MS is the traditional MS method without DP, and Ori is the original
results without perturbation.
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Figure 11: Bias, log of RMSE, 95% CP, and log of the 95% CI width for β1 in simulation study
4. MODIPS represents the model-based differentially private data synthesis, PERT represents the
perturbed histogram method, MS is the traditional MS method without DP, and Ori is the original
results without perturbation.
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